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The Right to Delete: Protecting Consumer 
Autonomy in Direct-to-Consumer  
Genetic Testing 
Angela S. Gassner* 
We often think of DNA as a unique personal identifier. Yet, as of 2019,  
direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing companies have amassed the genetic data of more 
than twenty-six million consumers. This raises the concern that companies do not uniformly 
protect consumers’ genetic privacy. Substantiating such concerns are complaints that companies 
permit law enforcement access to their databases, sell consumer genetic information to third 
parties, pursue drug development, and suffer data breaches. 
Regulators have been slow to respond to this emerging privacy issue. The current legal 
framework is largely inadequate: there is no federal data-privacy law; courts and agencies are 
ill-equipped or lack directive to tackle a privacy issue of this magnitude; and current  
genetic-related laws focus on notice, informed consent, and antidiscrimination. However, 
recently enacted state data-privacy laws like the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) 
and California Privacy Rights Act (CPRA) may serve as a legal framework to address 
privacy in the DTC genetic testing context. 
Under the CCPA and CPRA, the right to delete promises to give control back to 
consumers over their genetic information. However, further genetic-specific regulations under 
the CCPA and CPRA, or a separate genetic-privacy statute, are needed to protect privacy in 
the DTC genetic testing context while balancing against legitimate business and governmental 
interests. This Note attempts to delineate how such a balance can be achieved. 
  
 
* J.D., University of California, Irvine School of Law, 2021. I thank Professor Michele B. Goodwin for 
her thoughtful guidance throughout the writing process and my colleagues in the Fall 2019 
Biotechnology and The Law course for their commentary on the contours of this Note. I am also 
grateful for the work of Emma O’Hanlon, Alicia Hernandez, and the editorial team at the UC Irvine 
Law Review. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For costs ranging from $99 to $199,1 DTC genetic testing companies promise 
to provide personalized information to consumers about their ancestry, traits, and 
 
1. 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com [https://perma.cc/J8K4-B3PW] ( last visited  
Oct. 23, 2021); DNA, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/dna [https://perma.cc/MVW5-YBK2] 
( last visited Oct. 23, 2021). 
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health.2 Ancestry, a leading DTC genetic testing company,3 provides information 
on a person’s ethnicity, ancestors’ migration paths, and DNA matches to other 
users.4 23andMe, another leading DTC genetic testing company,5 offers over 150 
reports covering topics like health predisposition, genetic-carrier status, ancestry, 
and traits.6 Arguably, DTC genetic tests may improve access to and engagement 
with health information, in contrast to the traditional form of health information 
delivery through medical professionals.7 For example, 23andMe’s “Health  
+ Ancestry Service” includes health predisposition reports, wellness reports, and 
carrier-status reports that purport to assess a person’s chances of developing health 
conditions like type 2 diabetes and the possibility of transmitting genetic variants 
 
2. DTC genetic tests are marketed directly to consumers through television, print 
advertisements, or the internet; can be bought online or in stores; and require that consumers collect 
and send their biological samples, such as saliva, to companies for testing and analysis. See  
Direct-to-Consumer Tests, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/vitro-diagnostics/direct-
consumer-tests [https://perma.cc/5K86-B6UV] (Dec. 20, 2019); What Is Direct-to-Consumer Genetic 
Testing?, MEDLINEPLUS, https://medlineplus.gov/genetics/understanding/dtcgenetictesting/direct 
toconsumer [https://perma.cc/HWN9-HT57] (Sept. 21, 2020). 
3. Ancestry and 23andMe are the two “superpowers” dominating market share and decreasing 
competition due to the “network effect,” a phenomenon where increased participants in a network 
improve the value of a good or service. See Antonio Regalado, More than 26 Million People Have Taken 
an At-Home Ancestry Test, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/
612880/more-than-26-million-people-have-taken-an-at-home-ancestry-test [https://perma.cc/W7L 
W-XJXT]; see also Caroline Banton, Network Effect, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/
terms/n/network-effect.asp [https://perma.cc/F2MV-WHZJ] (Apr. 3, 2021) (describing “network 
effect” phenomenon). 
4. What to Expect from Your AncestryDNA® Test Results., ANCESTRY, https://
www.ancestry.com/dna/lp/what-to-expect-ancestrydna-test [https://perma.cc/D6TR-SDUA] ( last 
visited Oct. 23, 2020). 
5. See Regalado, supra note 3. 
6. 23ANDME, supra note 1. 
7. See Megan A. Allyse, David H. Robinson, Matthew J. Ferber & Richard R. Sharp,  
Direct-to-Consumer Testing 2.0: Emerging Models of Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing, 93 MAYO CLINIC 
PROC. 113, 114–15 (2018) (describing how some view the convenience of DTC genetic testing, the 
promotion of personalized medicine, and the reduced costs to consumers and the health-care system 
as reasons DTC genetic testing is superior to traditional genetic testing, which is characterized by a 
dependence on expert knowledge and has been criticized for dampening innovation and restricting 
information); see also Monica A. Giovanni, Matthew R. Fickie, Lisa S. Lehmann, Robert C. Green, Lisa 
M. Meckley, David Veenstra & Michael F. Murray, Health-Care Referrals from Direct-to-Consumer 
Genetic Testing, 14 GENETIC TESTING & MOLECULAR BIOMARKERS 817, 818 (2010) (describing a 
survey of genetics professionals wherein 59.1% of the patients seen had self-referred to a genetic 
counselor or medical geneticist after taking a DTC genetic test, and 52.4% of genetics professionals 
found the initial DTC genetic testing to be clinically useful). But see Kathy Hudson, Gail Javitt, Wylie 
Burke, Peter Byers & Am. Soc’y Hum. Genetics, Society News, ASHG Statement on Direct-to-Consumer 
Genetic Testing in the United States, 81 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 635, 636 (2007) (“Consumers are at a 
significant risk of selecting tests with unproven benefit, of obtaining testing services from laboratories 
of dubious quality, and of making decisions without timely and accurate genetic counseling.”). 
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linked to inheritable diseases like cystic fibrosis.8 Whether DTC genetic tests can 
integrate cohesively with health-care systems remains to be seen.9 
Despite all that these tests may reveal, a disparity exists between what 
consumers and companies gain from DTC genetic testing. One issue is test 
reliability: one study found forty percent of harmful variants reported in the raw 
genetic data produced by DTC genetic tests were false positives when compared to 
confirmatory test results, almost all related to cancer susceptibility.10 Concerns 
regarding test result accuracy have even led the Pentagon to urge military personnel 
not to take “mail-in DNA tests,” as they could “create security risks, are unreliable 
and could negatively affect” careers.11 DTC genetic tests may also be wildly misused. 
A person’s used items, such as bedsheets or clothing, can be surreptitiously tested 
without his or her consent when another person sends the items to a DTC genetic 
testing company, often to ascertain paternity or infidelity.12 Furthermore, 
companies have been accused of reeling in consumers through deeply discounted 
prices and aggressive marketing,13 sometimes even towards parents and their 
children.14 More people buying tests increases the potential for discrimination based 
 
8. Health + Ancestry Service, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/dna-health-ancestry 
[https://perma.cc/9ACU-SLAS] ( last visited Oct. 23, 2021). 
9. Even though skepticism about the clinical utility of genomic information remains, forty-three 
percent of American primary care providers surveyed in a study indicated they would be likely or very 
likely to change the management of a hypothetical patient based on a complex disease report from a 
DTC genetic testing company. Barbara A. Bernhardt, Cara Zayac, Erynn S. Gordon, Lisa Wawak, Reed 
E. Pyeritz & Sarah E. Gollust, Incorporating Direct-to-Consumer Genomic Information into Patient  
Care: Attitudes and Experiences of Primary Care Physicians, 9 PERSONALIZED MED. 683, 687–88 (2012). 
10. Stephany Tandy-Connor, Jenna Guiltinan, Kate Krempely, Holly LaDuca, Patrick Reineke, 
Stephanie Gutierrez, Phillip Gray & Brigette Tippin Davis, False-Positive Results Released by  
Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Tests Highlight the Importance of Clinical Confirmation Testing for Appropriate 
Patient Care, 20 GENETICS MED. 1515, 1518 (2018). 
11. Heather Murphy & Mihir Zaveri, Pentagon Warns Military Personnel Against At-Home 
DNA Tests, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/24/us/military-dna-
tests.html [https://perma.cc/CG89-B9DQ]. 
12. See Andelka M. Phillips, ‘Only a Click Away—DTC Genetics for Ancestry, Health,  
Love . . . and More: A View of the Business and Regulatory Landscape,’ 8 APPLIED & TRANSLATIONAL 
GENOMICS 16, 19 (2016). One recent survey of ninety DTC genetic testing companies found that 
almost one-third offered some form of surreptitious testing. James W. Hazel & Christopher Slobogin, 
Who Knows What, and When?: A Survey of the Privacy Policies Proffered by U.S. Direct-to-Consumer 
Genetic Testing Companies, 28 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 35, 47–48 (2018); see also Phillips, supra, at 
17 (finding 34 of 246 DTC genetic companies profiled, or fourteen percent of companies, conducted 
surreptitious testing). Another study found that thirty-five percent of consumers who had purchased 
tests reported they had submitted the sample of another person for testing, and thirty-eight percent of 
those who had ordered a test on someone else had done so without consent. Emily Christofides  
& Kieran O’Doherty, Company Disclosure and Consumer Perceptions of the Privacy Implications of  
Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing, 35 NEW GENETICS & SOC’Y 101, 112–13 (2016). 
13. Ruth Padawer, Sigrid Johnson Was Black. A DNA Test Said She Wasn’t., N.Y. TIMES  
MAG. (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/19/magazine/dna-test-black-family.html 
[https://perma.cc/LQJ9-4LH9]. 
14. DTC genetic testing companies have also used clever marketing and holiday deals to target 
parents and children, such as when 23andMe ran a commercial about Dr. Seuss’s the Grinch receiving 
a DNA kit as a gift. Emily Mullin, Should You Send Your Kid’s DNA to 23andMe?, WASH. POST  
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on genetic composition, which can occur in schools, the workplace, and with 
insurance companies.15 
DTC genetic testing companies stand to gain much from consumers’ 
biological samples and genetic information.16 First, companies have amassed 
enormous databases that are still growing,17 which help improve database reference 
populations that are too small or insular to be accurately applied to consumers.18 As 
the databases continue to grow and the accuracy of results improve, the value of 
genetic tests increases, enticing more consumers to buy them.19 After the initial 
testing and analysis of biological samples, companies have further capitalized on the 
genetic information obtained by allowing law enforcement access into databases,20 
selling consumer genetic information to third parties,21 and pursuing drug 
development.22 For example, 23andMe has disclosed that it works with a variety of 
academic, industry, and nonprofit collaborators to study ancestry, traits, and 
 
(Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/2018/12/19/should-you-send-your-
kids-dna-andme [https://perma.cc/V568-9TDT]. 
15. See, e.g., Lowe v. Atlas Logistics Grp. Retail Servs. (Atlanta), LLC, 102 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 
1362–64 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (finding federal genetic nondiscrimination law was violated where two 
warehouse employees were asked by their employer to take DNA tests to compare their DNA with 
fecal matter left on grocery products in the warehouse); Sarah Zhang, DNA Got a Kid Kicked Out of 
School—and It’ll Happen Again, WIRED (Feb. 1, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/02/
schools-kicked-boy-based-dna [https://perma.cc/BAD9-MEVR] (reporting the case of Colman 
Chadam, a sixth grader whom a local school district decided to transfer out of a particular school after 
teachers divulged to other parents that he carried genetic markers associated with cystic fibrosis, despite 
not having the disease). 
16. In this Note, the term “genetic information” is used to refer to raw genetic code and the 
corresponding test results provided by DTC genetic testing companies. 
17. Ancestry Surpasses 15 Million DNA Customers, ANCESTRY CORP. (May 31, 2019), https://
www.ancestry.com/corporate/blog/ancestry-surpasses-15-million-dna-customers [https://perma.cc/ 
X8JP-N4QH] (“[M]ore than 15 million customers have received DNA results! . . . But this is just the 
beginning. As the network continues to grow, we can deliver even more value to our members, 
including more granular insights about heritage and compelling new paths to learn about ourselves 
using genetics.”). 
18. See Troy Duster, A Post-Genomic Surprise. The Molecular Reinscription of Race in Science, 
Law and Medicine, 66 BRIT. J. SOCIO. 1, 11 (2015). 
19. See Zhang, supra note 15. 
20. Matthew Haag, FamilyTreeDNA Admits to Sharing Genetic Data with F.B.I., N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/04/business/family-tree-dna-fbi.html [https:// 
perma.cc/GFN9-MBRR] (reporting FamilyTreeDNA’s press release apologizing for failing to disclose 
that it was allowing the FBI to access its database of over two million records to solve  
violent crimes). 
21. Erin Brodwin, DNA-Testing Companies Like 23andMe Sell Your Genetic Data to 
Drugmakers and Other Silicon Valley Startups, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 3, 2018, 8:45 AM), https://
www.businessinsider.com/dna-testing-ancestry-23andme-share-data-companies-2018-8 [https:// 
perma.cc/9CAE-CUJC] (highlighting particular DTC genetic testing companies’ third-party 
partnerships with pharmaceutical companies, personal-care companies, public academic institutions, 
nonprofit research groups, startups, and health-care providers). 
22. Denise Roland, How Drug Companies Are Using Your DNA to Make New Medicine, WALL 
ST. J. ( July 22, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/23andme-glaxo-mine-dna-data-in-hunt-for-new-
drugs-11563879881 [https://perma.cc/8DBT-LH2C] (describing 23andMe’s partnership with 
GlaxoSmithKline that produced six potential drug targets). 
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diseases; conduct clinical trials evaluating treatments for diseases; and identify new 
genetic associations.23 
These privacy concerns lead to important questions, including to what extent 
consumers may control their genetic information once given to DTC genetic testing 
companies. It is extremely easy to share one’s DNA with DTC genetic testing 
companies—sending them a simple saliva sample will suffice.24 Unfortunately, as 
journalist Kristen V. Brown found, genetic information, once shared, is “brutally 
difficult” to delete.25 Brown had shared her genetic information with “nearly a 
dozen companies” and wanted to delete her information from these companies’ 
databases.26 Through an arduous, weeks-long process of calling and emailing 
various companies’ customer-service personnel, she discovered deletion was 
impossible due to federal and state regulations regarding laboratory quality control 
and her initial agreement to contribute her information towards research.27 
Ultimately, she concluded, “When you delete your DNA information, you are 
mainly hiding your information from yourself.”28 In other words, the companies 
she used for testing still retained her genetic information. 
Consumers are concerned about their genetic privacy.29 Yet, as of the 
beginning of 2019, more than twenty-six million consumers have added their 
genetic information to the top four DTC genetic testing companies at the  
time: Ancestry, Gene By Gene, MyHeritage, and 23andMe.30 The fact that so many 
consumers have used DTC genetic tests can be attributed to “[s]urging public 
interest in ancestry and health—propelled by heavy TV and online marketing.”31 
Indeed, Ancestry’s family-tree-building feature has allowed people to discover 
 
23. Research, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/research/?vip=true [https://perma.cc/ 
ZB9K-5HMR] ( last visited Oct. 23, 2021). 
24. See Direct-to-Consumer Tests, supra note 2. 
25. Kristen V. Brown, Deleting Your Online DNA Data Is Brutally Difficult, BLOOMBERG 




27. Id. (“‘The federal Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA) of 1988 and 
California laboratory regulations require the lab store your de-identified genotyping test results and to 
keep a minimal amount of test result or analysis information,’ an email from 23andMe said.”). 
28. Id. 
29. Sarah E. Gollust, Stacy W. Gray, Deanna Alexis Carere, Barbara A. Koenig, Lisa Soleymani 
Lehmann, Amy L. McGuire, Richard R. Sharp, Kayte Spector-Bagdady, Na Wang, Robert C. Green  
& J. Scott Roberts, Consumer Perspectives on Access to Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing: Role of 
Demographic Factors and the Testing Experience, 95 MILBANK Q. 291, 300 (2017) (“83.2% [of 941 study 
participants] agree[d] overall . . . that it is important that genetic information is kept private.”). 
30. Regalado, supra note 3. According to Ancestry’s president and CEO Margo Georgiadi, thirty 
million people globally have taken a DNA test. Rani Molla, Why DNA Tests Are Suddenly Unpopular, 
VOX (Feb. 13, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/2/13/21129177/consumer-dna-
tests-23andme-ancestry-sales-decline [https://web.archive.org/web/20200518173157/https://www. 
vox.com/recode/2020/2/13/21129177/consumer-dna-tests-23andme-ancestry-sales-decline ]. 
31. Regalado, supra note 3. 
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relatives they never knew about.32 As of November 2020, 23andMe has published 
172 scientific papers in various journals based on internal and collaborative research 
using its consumer database.33 These companies are here to stay, and consumers 
will likely continue to engage with them as companies expand their offerings in the 
health-care space.34 The central inquiry thus becomes how the legal framework in 
the United States can be improved upon to adequately secure genetic privacy by 
protecting consumer autonomy over genetic information, while simultaneously 
ensuring that business and governmental interests such as research and law 
enforcement are not unduly burdened by strict privacy laws. 
This Note makes three conceptual arguments. First, genetic-privacy concerns 
necessitate context-specific policies that maximize consumer autonomy. Second, 
the current legal framework in the United States applicable to DTC genetic testing 
is largely inadequate, but recent state data-privacy laws like the California Consumer 
Privacy Act (CCPA) and California Privacy Rights Act (CPRA) may serve as model 
legislation for genetic-privacy protection. Third, a balanced approach to the right to 
delete under the CCPA and CPRA will help secure genetic privacy by protecting 
consumer autonomy over genetic information. 
Part I describes the DTC genetic testing industry’s development in the age of 
big data and personalized medicine and the federal government’s response to the 
emerging industry. Part II argues consumers need context-specific genetic-privacy 
policies that maximize their autonomy. Currently, companies and affiliated third 
parties erode autonomy by collecting and using genetic information in ways that are 
not transparent and bypass consent. Part III highlights how the current legal 
framework largely fails to adequately prevent the loss of autonomy, apart from the 
CCPA and CPRA. Part IV explores how the right to delete under the CCPA and 
CPRA could be applied to ensure consumer autonomy in the DTC genetic testing 
context while balancing against legitimate business and governmental interests. 
I. THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF HUMAN GENETIC CODE 
An understanding of the discovery of DNA, the development of related 
technology, and the subsequent commercialization of that technology leads to a 
deeper appreciation of the promise and danger of DTC genetic testing. Part I 
 
32. It’s All in the Genes: One Man Discovers Seven Famous Relatives, ANCESTRY (Aug. 25,  
2016), https://blogs.ancestry.com/cm/its-all-in-the-genes-one-man-discovers-seven-famous-relatives 
[https://perma.cc/T7AG-4XUA] (describing man who discovered seven famous relatives using DTC 
genetic test results); Amy Dockser Marcus, Two Sisters Bought DNA Kits. The Results Blew Apart Their 
Family., WALL ST. J. (Feb. 1, 2019, 11:18 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/two-sisters-bought-dna-
kits-the-results-blew-apart-their-family-11549037904 [https://perma.cc/J7TP-G8JP] (detailing how 
two sisters took DTC genetic tests and found out both their parents had extramarital affairs). 
33. Since 2010, 23andMe Has Published 172 Papers, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/
publications [https://perma.cc/8FF8-4E6K] ( last visited Oct. 23, 2021). 
34. See Zoë LaRock, 23andMe’s Latest FDA Approval Should Boost Its Personalized Medicine 
Play, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 21, 2020, 6:19 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/23andme-takes-
bigger-step-into-personalized-medicine-2020-8 [https://perma.cc/3MVC-R953]. 
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explores the discovery of DNA and the development of sequencing technology and 
identifies two recent shifts in technology and medicine that hastened the 
commercial growth of the DTC genetic testing industry. Part I also details the 
federal government’s regulatory response and later cautious approval of DTC 
genetic testing, which opened the door for companies to enter the health-care space. 
A. The Discovery of DNA and Development of Sequencing Technology 
The pathway to discovering what is known today as DNA35 had humble 
beginnings. In 1865, Gregor Mendel, also known as the “father of genetics,” 
discovered certain principles of heredity based on his experiments with pea plants.36 
In 1869, Swiss scientist Friedrich Miescher first isolated  
DNA—which he called “nuclein”—from white blood cells.37 This term was 
eventually changed to deoxyribonucleic acid, or DNA.38 
Continuing up to the middle of the twentieth century, numerous scientists 
continued to build upon prior research in the pursuit of learning more about DNA, 
leading to stepwise discoveries regarding the phosphate-sugar-base structure of 
nucleotides and the base pairing of purines and pyrimidines.39 In the early 1950s, 
researchers Rosalind Franklin and Maurice Wilkins at King’s College London 
conducted experiments to determine the structure of DNA through imaging using 
X-ray crystallography.40 This research, particularly Wilkins’s unpermitted showing 
of Franklin’s Photo 51, led directly to James Watson and Francis Crick’s famous 
discovery of DNA’s double-helix structure.41 
By the 1970s, researchers had begun piecing together the conceptual 
framework for DNA replication and the encoding of proteins, but they still could 
not “read” DNA sequences.42 Then, in 1977, a major breakthrough that “forever 
altered the progress of DNA sequencing technology” occurred: Frederick Sanger 
developed the chain-termination method for rapidly sequencing DNA, now known 
 
35. DNA makes up the hereditary material in humans and is formed by the sequential pairing 
of four chemical bases—adenine, thymine, guanine, and cytosine. What Is DNA?, MEDLINEPLUS, 
https://medlineplus.gov/genetics/understanding/basics/dna [https://perma.cc/UMV9-T3GR] 
(Jan. 19, 2021). 
36. Robert Olby, Gregor Mendel, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
biography/Gregor-Mendel [https://perma.cc/FZ5F-4D6P] ( last visited Oct. 23, 2021). 
37. Ralf Dahm, Review, Friedrich Miescher and the Discovery of DNA, 278 DEVELOPMENTAL 
BIOLOGY 274, 275–77 (2005). 
38. Leslie A. Pray, Discovery of DNA Structure and Function: Watson and Crick, 1 NATURE 
EDUC. 100 (2008). 
39. Id. 
40. James Watson, Francis Crick, Maurice Wilkins, and Rosalind Franklin, SCI. HIST. INST., 
https://www.sciencehistory.org/historical-profile/james-watson-francis-crick-maurice-wilkins-and-
rosalind-franklin [https://perma.cc/7TMR-RLSU] (Dec. 4, 2017). 
41. Jane J. Lee, 6 Women Scientists Who Were Snubbed Due to Sexism, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC 
(May 19, 2013), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/5/130519-women-scientists-over 
looked-dna-history-science [https://perma.cc/GF5J-NKCF]. 
42. James M. Heather & Benjamin Chain, Review, The Sequence of Sequencers: The History of 
Sequencing DNA, 107 GENOMICS 1, 1 (2016). 
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as the predominant first-generation DNA sequencing technique.43 Rapid 
sequencing facilitated the completion of the Human Genome Project  
(1990–2003),44 during which researchers determined the complete sequence of 
human DNA, mapped gene locations for major sections of all chromosomes, and 
produced linkage maps for tracking inherited traits.45 In the span of just fifty years, 
scientists learned the sequence and intricacies of what Francis Collins, then Director 
of the National Human Genome Research Institute, termed “an incredibly detailed 
blueprint for building every human cell” that would “give health care providers 
immense new powers to treat, prevent and cure disease.”46 
B. Harnessing DNA Testing Technology 
Soon after the success of first-generation sequencing, the DTC genetic testing 
industry started to probe how sequencing could be harnessed to create commercial 
products.47 Companies started to develop various alternative second-generation 
sequencing techniques that more quickly produced larger quantities of data at a 
higher quality and a reduced cost.48 This period marked the broadening of the use 
of DNA technology beyond its original use as a tool purely for research purposes. 
For example, it was in this time of commercialization that future industry  
giants Ancestry, founded in 1996,49 and 23andMe, founded in 2006,50  
established themselves. 
Today, DNA can be tested commercially through genotyping or sequencing.51 
The fastest and cheapest way to conduct DTC genetic testing is through 
genotyping,52 which looks at selected genetic markers called single nucleotide 
 
43. See id. at 2–3. 
44. The Human Genome Project, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RSCH. INST., https://
www.genome.gov/human-genome-project [https://perma.cc/LZ6W-KDM4] (Dec. 22, 2020). 
45. What Is the Human Genome Project?, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RSCH. INST., https://
www.genome.gov/human-genome-project/What [https://perma.cc/74NL-G53J ] (Oct. 28, 2018). 
46. Id. 
47. See Heather & Chain, supra note 42, at 3–5. 
48. Jay Shendure & Hanlee Ji, Review, Next-Generation DNA Sequencing, 26 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 1135, 1143 (2008). 
49. Our Story, ANCESTRY CORP., https://www.ancestry.com/corporate/about-ancestry/our-
story [https://perma.cc/U5UC-CPVZ] ( last visited Nov. 19, 2020) (listing 1996 as the year Ancestry 
Publishing launched Ancestry.com). 
50. About Us, 23ANDME, https://mediacenter.23andme.com/company/about-us 
[http://web.archive.org/web/20210313230453/https://mediacenter.23andme.com/company-2/ 
about-us/ ] ( last visited Mar. 13, 2021) (listing 2006 as the founding year). 
51. See Behind the Bench Staff, Direct-to-Consumer (DTC) Genetic Ancestry Reports: Why 
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polymorphisms (SNPs)53 in the genome using DNA microarray technology.54 
Developed in the 1990s and 2000s, DNA microarray technology is a  
second-generation sequencing technique that has become “highly successful and 
widely used.”55 Ancestry and 23andMe both use genotyping and DNA microarray 
technology to analyze DNA samples collected from their consumers.56 
Even though microarray-based tests are still the gold standard for DTC genetic 
testing, there is some interest in whole genome sequencing or whole exome 
sequencing,57 which involve either sequencing the entire genome or only the 
protein-coding regions of genes, respectively.58 Some DTC genetic companies are 
taking advantage of the advances in software, hardware, and artificial  
intelligence59: Veritas, for example, now offers a whole genome sequencing product 
for $599 and predicted the cost will fall to $100–$200 by 2021.60 Similarly, 
California-based start-up Nebula Genomics has recently launched a whole genome 
sequencing consumer product for $299.61 These costs are a stark contrast to the one 
billion dollars it took for the Human Genome Project’s researchers to produce a 
complete reference sequence of the human genome.62 With costs continuing to fall, 
 
53. An individual has approximately four to five million SNPs, or locations within DNA that 
differ in the chemical based used. What Are Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs)?, MEDLINEPLUS, 
https://medlineplus.gov/genetics/understanding/genomicresearch/snp [https://perma.cc/72EK-
3L82] (Sept. 18, 2020). 
54. DNA microarray technology uses a “chip” with thousands of short, synthetic,  
single-stranded DNA, to which an individual’s single-stranded DNA that is tagged with a dye and 
control DNA are added. DNA Microarray Technology Fact Sheet, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RSCH. INST., 
https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/DNA-Microarray-Technology [https:// 
perma.cc/V9GF-RR8W] (Aug. 15, 2020). Based on how the individual’s DNA and the control DNA 
bind to the chip’s DNA, a researcher will be able to tell if the individual has a mutation for a specific 
genetic marker. Id. 
55. Roger Bumgarner, Overview of DNA Microarrays: Types, Applications, and Their Future, 101 
CURRENT PROTOCOLS MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 22.1.1, 22.1.2, 22.1.6 (2013); see also Shendure & Ji, 
supra note 48 (describing microarray technology as “widespread, commoditized and routine”). 
56. Genotyping Services for Research, 23ANDME, https://research.23andme.com/genotyping-
services-research/ [https://perma.cc/AB67-Y3XN] ( last visited Oct. 24, 2021); Frequently Asked 
Questions, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/dna/en/legal/us/faq#about-3 [https://perma.cc/ 
F53Y-6GVQ] ( last visited Oct. 24, 2021). 
57. See Allison Gatlin, Genetic Testing Companies Take DNA Tests to a Whole New Level, INV.’S 
BUS. DAILY (Dec. 6, 2019, 9:04 AM), https://www.investors.com/news/technology/genetic-testing-
companies-take-dna-tests-new-level-genome-sequencing [https://perma.cc/X764-CSFU]. 
58. What Are Whole Exome Sequencing and Whole Genome Sequencing?, MEDLINEPLUS, https:// 
medlineplus.gov/genetics/understanding/testing/sequencing [https://perma.cc/B9DA-PJ3T] (July 
28, 2021). 
59. Gatlin, supra note 57. 
60. Joe Andrews, 23andMe Competitor Veritas Genetics Slashes Price of Whole Genome Sequencing 
40% to $600, CNBC ( July 1, 2019, 9:30 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/01/for-600-veritas-
genetics-sequences-6point4-billion-letters-of-your-dna.html [https://perma.cc/NT8U-EWU9]. 
61. Dane Finley, Nebula Genomics Rolled Out a Low-Cost Genome Sequencing Test to Consumers, 
BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 20, 2020, 7:05 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/nebula-launches-direct-to-
consumer-whole-genome-sequencing-test-2020-2 [https://perma.cc/W354-K6RQ]. 
62. The 10-Year Anniversary of the Human Genome Project: Commemorating and Reflecting,  
NAT’L HUM. GENOME RSCH. INST., https://www.genome.gov/27555238/april-2013-the-10year-
Clean Final Edit_Gassner_V2.docx (Do Not Delete) 11/8/21  8:20 AM 
2021] THE RIGHT TO DELETE 277 
whole genome or exome sequencing will continue to become more accessible, 
creating a potential area of growth for DTC genetic testing companies. 
C. The Rapid Commercialization of DNA Testing 
The growth of the DTC genetic testing industry did not occur in a vacuum. 
While testing technology developed and commercial interests intensified, two shifts 
in technology and medicine simultaneously helped hasten the growth of the 
industry: the rise of big data and personalized medicine. 
1. Big Data 
Big data in the biomedical context refers to a “new generation of technologies 
and architectures, designed to extract value from large volumes of a wide variety of 
data by enabling high-velocity capture, discovery and analysis.”63 Big data has led to 
the creation of the “Internet of Things” (IoT), the rise of social media and  
e-commerce, and the formation of large companies like Google and Amazon that 
collect and store data.64 The massive amount of data collected from IoT devices 
and the increased capacity to store that data led to the development of artificial 
intelligence (AI) algorithms, which in turn improve based on the collection and 
input of even more data.65 
In 2001, Doug Laney defined the “3Vs,” or characteristics, of big data as high 
volume, velocity, and variety.66 DTC genetic testing companies clearly share 
common traits with well-known big-data companies like Google, and some 
explicitly aim to become just as ubiquitous within the health-care space.67 DNA data 
 
anniversary-of-the-human-genome-project-commemorating-and-reflecting [https://perma.cc/KS63-
5VF2] (Oct. 21, 2013). 
63. Fabricio F. Costa, Review, Big Data in Biomedicine, 19 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 433,  
434 (2014). 
64. In 2007, the launch of the first iPhone marked big data’s move to the consumer space, 
which was quickly followed by a proliferation of smartphones, wearable technology, tablets, and other 
devices that collectively made up the IoT. Charles Towers-Clark, Big Data, IoT, and AI, Part  




66. Svetlana Sicular, Gartner’s Big Data Definition Consists of Three Parts, Not to Be Confused 
with Three “V”s, FORBES (Mar. 27, 2013, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/gartnergroup/
2013/03/27/gartners-big-data-definition-consists-of-three-parts-not-to-be-confused-with-three-vs/? 
sh=175874d7 42f6 [https://perma.cc/86SC-M3LK] (stating that volume refers to the amount of data, 
velocity refers to the growth of data, and variety refers to the formats of data). 
67. For example, Patrick Chung, a 23andMe board member, stated in 2013 that 23andMe aimed 
to become the “Google of personalized health care.” Elizabeth Murphy, Inside 23andMe Founder Anne 
Wojcicki’s $99 DNA Revolution, FAST CO. (Oct. 14, 2013), https://www.fastcompany.com/30185 
98/for-99-this-ceo-can-tell-you-what-might-kill-you-inside-23andme-founder-anne-wojcickis-dna-r 
[https://perma.cc/UL56-5JNE]. 
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is high volume by nature.68 With millions of consumers contributing DNA,69 DTC 
genetic testing companies have cultivated a high variety of data at a high velocity. 
Thus, these companies can be appropriately categorized as big-data companies with 
incentives to refine their technologies and grow large collections of genetic 
information70 despite privacy concerns. 
2. Personalized Medicine 
The DTC genetic testing industry’s rise in the mid-2000s was in some ways a 
reaction to the traditional medical model of providing genetic testing that restricted 
genetics to medical settings and expert interpretation.71 The medical model involves 
a medical professional ordering a clinically indicated genetic test for a patient and a 
licensed, board-certified medical provider interpreting and delivering the results.72 
A number of drawbacks to the medical model include slower innovation, scarcity 
of medical geneticists and genetic counselors, and restriction of genetic information 
to the health-care context.73 
In opposition to the traditional medical model, DTC genetic testing 
companies offer an alternative consumer-initiated model of learning about one’s 
health.74 The consumer-initiated model is a big-data model that has the potential to 
“trigger[ ] a convergence between the healthcare industry and the life sciences 
industry,” leading a shift away from population-based health care to personalized 
medicine.75 Personalized medicine is defined as “an emerging practice of medicine 
that uses an individual’s genetic profile to guide decisions made in regard to the 
prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of disease.”76 With the help of big data, 
researchers hope to create targeted treatments for specific diseases, with companies 
providing solutions to generate, store, and interpret data.77 
 
68. See What Is DNA?, supra note 35 (“Human DNA consists of about 3 billion  
[base pairs] . . . .”). 
69. Regalado, supra note 3. 
70. Companies continue to improve DNA test results by refining their AI algorithms that are 
developed from reference data sets, which usually combine data from publicly available databases and 
the company’s own and ever-growing consumer data. See Behind the Bench Staff, supra note 51; see also 
ERIC Y. DURAND, CHUONG B. DO, JOANNA L. MOUNTAIN & J. MICHAEL MACPHERSON, 23ANDME, 
ANCESTRY COMPOSITION: A NOVEL, EFFICIENT PIPELINE FOR ANCESTRY DECONVOLUTION 
(2014) (example of ancestry algorithm). 
71. See Allyse et al., supra note 7, at 114. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 114–15. 
74. See Nur Lalji, Featurization and the Myth of Data Empowerment, 15  
WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 1, 13 (2019) (describing products such as genetic testing kits as “marketed 
in a way that capitalizes on the mentality of the ‘quantified self’ movement—that more information 
and more revelations make life better”). 
75. See Costa, supra note 63, at 433, 436. 
76. Personalized Medicine, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RSCH. INST., https://www.genome.gov/
genetics-glossary/Personalized-Medicine [https://perma.cc/7ZGS-FC3Y] ( last visited Oct. 24, 2021). 
77. Costa, supra note 63, at 434 fig.1. 
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In 2008, leaders of prominent DTC genetic testing companies were invited to 
a workshop convened by the National Institutes of Health and the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention; they denied that their products were medical tests 
and that “medicalization,” or entering the health-care space, was part of their 
business model.78 Yet in 2011, DTC genetic testing companies began working with 
federally approved laboratories and sought to be providers of presymptomatic or 
diagnostic medical tests.79 Perhaps to combat the recent decline in sales of DNA 
testing kits,80 companies like 23andMe are seeking to maximize the interpretive 
value of their consumer data by developing new health-related tests81 or upgrading 
their DNA microarray chips.82 As companies continue to expand into the  
health-care space, it is clear they are actively seeking ways to get more value out of 
consumer data, which should be subject to more stringent regulatory and  
ethical scrutiny. 
D. The Federal Government’s Response 
Despite the growth of the nascent industry in the early 2000s, the DTC genetic 
testing industry soon encountered a number of regulatory roadblocks that 
temporarily dampened growth.83 Critics took issue with the methodology of finding 
potential associations between SNPs and disease outcomes, the risk of consumers 
misinterpreting results, the underinclusiveness of reference data sets of certain 
ethnic and racial populations, the framing of DTC genetic tests as commercial 
transactions, and the user agreements that did not require informed consent to sell 
 
78. Kenneth Offit, Review, Personalized Medicine: New Genomics, Old Lessons, 130  
HUM. GENETICS 3, 4 (2011); see also Muin J. Khoury, Colleen M. McBride, Sheri D. Schully, John  
P. A. Ioannidis, W. Gregory Feero, A. Cecile J. W. Janssens, Marta Gwinn, Denise G. Simons-Morton, 
Jay M. Bernhardt, Michele Cargill, Stephen J. Chanock, George M. Church, Ralph J. Coates, Francis  
S. Collins, Robert T. Croyle, Barry R. Davis, Gregory J. Downing, Amy DuRoss, Susan Friedman, 
Mitchell H. Gail, Geoffrey S. Ginsburg, Robert C. Green, Mark H. Greene, Philip Greenland, Jeffrey 
R. Gulcher, Andro Hsu, Kathy L. Hudson, Sharon L. R. Kardia, Paul L. Kimmel, Michael S. Lauer, 
Amy M. Miller, Kenneth Offit, David F. Ransohoff, J. Scott Roberts, Rebekah S. Rasooly, Kari 
Stefansson, Sharon F. Terry, Steven M. Teutsch, Angela Trepanier, Kay L. Wanke, John S. Witte  
& Jianfeng Xu, Review, The Scientific Foundation for Personal Genomics: Recommendations from a 
National Institutes of Health–Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Multidisciplinary Workshop, 11 
GENETICS MED. 559, 559 (2009) (industry attendees included leaders from Navigenics, deCODE 
Genetics, and 23andMe). 
79. Offit, supra note 78. 
80. See Rachel Sandler, 23andMe Lays Off 14% of Workforce Amid Declining DNA Test Sales, 
FORBES ( Jan. 23, 2020, 3:22 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rachelsandler/2020/ 
01/23/23andme-lays-off-14-of-workforce-amid-declining-dna-test-sales/?sh=500ef1777f3a [https:// 
perma.cc/X54M-5GFU]. 
81. See infra notes 89–92. 
82. Upgrading to 23andMe’s Newest Chip Version, 23ANDME, https://customer 
care.23andme.com/hc/en-us/articles/218392668-Upgrading-to-23andMe-s-Newest-Version [http:// 
web.archive.org/web/20210301102745/https://customercare.23andme.com/hc/en-us/articles/2183 
92668-Upgrading-to-23andMe-s-Newest-Version ] ( last visited Mar. 1, 2021). 
83. See Allyse et al., supra note 7, at 116–17. 
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consumer data to third parties.84 Spurred on by such concerns, the  
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) launched an investigation into the 
practices of DTC genetic testing companies in 2006 and subsequently published a 
2010 report concluding that DTC genetic test results were misleading and ten out 
of the fifteen companies investigated had engaged in “fraudulent, deceptive, or 
otherwise questionable marketing practices.”85 
Alerted by the GAO report, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
sent letters to the five largest DTC genetic testing companies on June 10, 2010, 
informing them that their products were medical devices that had not been subject 
to premarket review and approval.86 On July 22, 2010, the U.S. House Committee 
on Energy and Commerce convened a hearing to discuss DTC genetic testing and 
its consequences to public health.87 Finally, on November 22, 2013, the FDA issued 
a cease-and-desist letter to 23andMe to stop the marketing of its DTC genetic test,88 
leading to one reporter proclaiming that “23andMe’s Most Useful Service Is 
Basically Dead.”89 
However, the industry soon bounced back despite the initial regulatory 
roadblocks. Starting in 2015, the FDA authorized for marketing 23andMe’s Bloom 
Syndrome carrier test and further stated that it intended to exempt carrier screening 
tests from premarket review.90 In 2017, the FDA allowed 23andMe to market its 
 
84. Id. at 115–16. 
85. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-847T, DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER GENETIC 
TESTS: MISLEADING TEST RESULTS ARE FURTHER COMPLICATED BY DECEPTIVE MARKETING AND 
OTHER QUESTIONABLE PRACTICES 1–4, 15 (2010). 
86. See Letter from Alberto Gutierrez, Dir., OHT7, FDA, to Anne Wojcicki, President  
& Co-Founder, 23andMe, Inc. ( June 10, 2010), https://www.fda.gov/media/79205/download 
[https://perma.cc/94L7-KQYD]; Letter from Alberto Gutierrez, Dir, OHT7, FDA to Earl M. Collier, 
Jr., CEO, deCODE Genetics ( June 10, 2010), https://www.fda.gov/media/79216/download 
[https://perma.cc/D82T-GYJQ]; Letter from Alberto Gutierrez, Dir., OHT7, FDA to Jay T. Flatley, 
President & CEO, Illumina, Inc. ( June 10, 2010), https://www.fda.gov/media/79226/download 
[https://perma.cc/APN2-GHZ6]; Letter from Alberto Gutierrez, Dir., OHT7, FDA to Jorge Conde, 
Co-Founder & CEO, Knome, Inc. ( June 10, 2010), https://www.fda.gov/media/79198/download 
[https://perma.cc/8Z6T-CEUB]; Letter from Alberto Gutierrez, Dir., OHT7, FDA to Vance Vanier, 
President & CEO, Navigenics ( June 10, 2010), https://www.fda.gov/media/79235/download 
[https://perma.cc/5K2A-6LSX]. 
87. See generally Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing and the Consequences to the Public  
Health: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and  
Com., 111th Cong. (2010). 
88. Letter from Alberto Gutierrez, Dir., OHT7, FDA to Anne Wojcicki, CEO, 23andMe,  




89. Megan Rose Dickey, 23andMe’s Most Useful Service Is Basically Dead, BUS. INSIDER  
(Dec. 6, 2013, 1:57 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/23andmes-most-useful-service-is-dead-
2013-12 [https://perma.cc/3SJG-ZHX5]. 
90. Press Release, FDA, FDA Permits Marketing of First Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Carrier 
Test for Bloom Syndrome (Feb. 19, 2015), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/Press 
Announcements/ucm435003.htm [https://wayback.archive-it.org/7993/20171114165526/https:// 
www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm435003.htm] (classifying carrier 
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genetic health risk tests for ten diseases or conditions, including Parkinson’s disease, 
late-onset Alzheimer’s disease, and celiac disease.91 In 2018, the FDA granted 
marketing authorization to 23andMe for two DTC genetic tests that report three 
mutations in the BRCA breast cancer genes92 and detect genetic variants potentially 
associated with medication metabolism.93 Most recently, 23andMe received FDA 
clearance for a genetic health risk report on a hereditary colorectal cancer 
syndrome94 and a pharmacogenetics report that provides interpretive drug 
information for certain heart and depression medications.95 These rapid 
authorizations, coupled with the FDA’s own statement implementing a streamlined 
review process for DTC genetic tests, indicate that the FDA’s concerned attention 
to DTC genetic testing companies in 2010–2013 did not herald a strong regulatory 
response after all.96 
There are other indicators that the DTC genetic testing industry is growing. 
Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, Blackstone—the nation’s largest private equity 
firm—is set to acquire Ancestry.com for $4.7 billion.97 As Ancestry President and 
CEO Margo Georgiadis noted, “Looking ahead, in collaboration with Blackstone, 
we will continue to leverage our unique content, powerhouse consumer brand and 
 
screening tests as Class II devices and exempting these devices from FDA premarket review based on 
the goal of promoting consumers’ direct access to personal genetic information and the requirement 
that DTC genetic testing companies explain the meaning of results to consumers in the  
product labeling). 
91. Press Release, FDA, FDA Allows Marketing of First Direct-to-Consumer Tests that 
Provide Genetic Risk Information for Certain Conditions (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/news-
events/press-announcements/fda-allows-marketing-first-direct-consumer-tests-provide-genetic-risk-
information-certain-conditions [https://perma.cc/Q9TX-QQRM]. 
92. Press Release, FDA, FDA Authorizes, With Special Controls, Direct-to-Consumer Test that 
Reports Three Mutations in the BRCA Breast Cancer Genes (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/
news-events/press-announcements/fda-authorizes-special-controls-direct-consumer-test-reports-three 
-mutations-brca-breast-cancer [https://perma.cc/6UDS-D4SN]. 
93. Press Release, FDA, FDA Authorizes First Direct-to-Consumer Test for Detecting Genetic 
Variants that May Be Associated with Medication Metabolism (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/
news-events/press-announcements/fda-authorizes-first-direct-consumer-test-detecting-genetic-variants 
-may-be-associated-medication [https://perma.cc/ULG6-CK3K]. 
94. Press Release, 23andMe, 23andMe Receives FDA Clearance for Direct-to-Consumer 
Genetic Test on a Hereditary Colorectal Cancer Syndrome ( Jan. 22, 2019), https://
mediacenter.23andme.com/press-releases/23andme-receives-fda-clearance-for-direct-to-consumer-
genetic-test-on-a-hereditary-colorectal-cancer-syndrome [https://perma.cc/749X-ATUB]. 
95. Press Release, 23andMe, 23andMe Granted New FDA Clearance to Provide Interpretive 
Drug Information for Two Commonly Prescribed Medications (Aug. 18, 2020), https://
mediacenter.23andme.com/press-releases/23andme-granted-clearance [https://perma.cc/5F9Y-WBVQ]. 
96. Press Release, FDA, Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., on 
Implementation of Agency’s Streamlined Development and Review Pathway for Consumer Tests that 
Evaluate Genetic Health Risks (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-
announcements/statement-fda-commissioner-scott-gottlieb-md-implementation-agencys-streamlined-
development-and [https://perma.cc/CFR7-8GEV]. For further background on the history of the 
FDA’s regulation of DTC genetic tests, see infra Section III.C. 
97. Stephen Gandel, Private Equity Wants to Own Your DNA¸ CBS NEWS (Aug. 7, 2020,  
4:52 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/blackstone-private-equity-ancestry-com-dna [https:// 
perma.cc/NS9H-3F4B]. 
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technology platform to expand our global Family History business while bringing 
to life our long-term vision of personalized preventive health.”98 23andMe 
continues to have an eye towards research and has recently published a study 
indicating genetic and non-genetic associations related to COVID-19.99 In sum, the 
FDA’s actions in 2010–2013 did not deter the growth of the DTC genetic testing 
industry. On the contrary, the industry learned to adapt, increased its repertoire of 
genetic tests, and actively used its trove of consumer genetic information to conduct 
internal and collaborative research. 
II. PRESERVING AUTONOMY OVER GENETIC INFORMATION 
Part I describes the scientific and societal context that led to the rise of the 
DTC genetic testing industry. Part II first examines the concept of genetic 
exceptionalism as an underlying rationale for protecting genetic information and 
surveys consumer perspectives on genetic privacy, which suggest that  
context-specific genetic-privacy policies that maximize consumer autonomy are 
needed. Part II subsequently analyzes how companies and third parties erode 
consumer autonomy over genetic information. 
A. Moving from Genetic Exceptionalism Towards Genetic Contextualism 
Arguments for genetic exceptionalism—an underlying rationale for strong 
genetic-privacy protection—first surfaced in the 1990s after the development of the 
first wave of predictive genetic tests.100 Genetic exceptionalism is the idea that 
genetic information should be treated differently than other types of medical data 
or personally identifiable information because it has certain special characteristics, 
including the uniqueness of each individual’s genetic code, the ability to predict the 
development of disease or the response to a drug, the immutable quality of DNA 
throughout an individual’s lifetime, the historical misuse of genetic information to 
promote eugenics and discrimination, the ability to reveal information about blood 
relatives, and the ease of procuring biological samples.101 Genetic information is 
even arguably more sacred than personal and health data retrieved from wearable 
 
98. Blackstone to Acquire Ancestry®, Leading Online Family History Business, for $4.7 Billion, 
BLACKSTONE (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.blackstone.com/press-releases/article/blackstone-to-
acquire-ancestry-leading-online-family-history-business-for-4-7-billion [https://perma.cc/W5LK-6SQH]. 
99. JANIE F. SHELTON, ANJALI J. SHASTRI, CHELSEA YE, CATHERINE H. WELDON, TERESA 
FILSHTEIN-SOMNEZ, DANIELLA COKER, ANTONY SYMONS, JORGE ESPARZA-GORDILLO, 
23ANDME COVID-19 TEAM, STELLA ASLIBEKYAN & ADAM AUTON, MEDRXIV, TRANS-ETHNIC 
ANALYSIS REVEALS GENETIC AND NON-GENETIC ASSOCIATIONS WITH COVID-19 
SUSCEPTIBILITY AND SEVERITY (2020), https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020. 
09.04.20188318v1.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3A2-KV3B]. 
100. Nanibaa’ A. Garrison, Kyle B. Brothers, Aaron J. Goldenberg & John A. Lynch, Genomic 
Contextualism: Shifting the Rhetoric of Genetic Exceptionalism, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Jan. 2019, at 51, 52. 
101. See Amy L. McGuire, Rebecca Fisher, Paul Cusenza, Kathy Hudson, Mark A. Rothstein, 
Deven McGraw, Stephen Matteson, John Glaser & Douglas E. Henley, Commentary, Confidentiality, 
Privacy, and Security of Genetic and Genomic Test Information in Electronic Health Records: Points to 
Consider, 10 GENETICS MED. 495, 496–97 (2008). 
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devices that routinely capture metrics such as heart rate, body temperature, 
movement, brain activity, moods, and emotions.102 This is because such biometric 
data is not unique to each individual, can change daily, and confers little knowledge 
about one’s blood relatives. 
However, some scholars are critical of genetic exceptionalism as a concept and 
as public policy.103 For example, Professors Lawrence O. Gostin and James  
G. Hodge, Jr., argue genetic information is not exceptional because it is not always 
determinative of disease like in the case of a single-gene disorder, and it is not 
feasible to separate genetic information from nongenetic information in a medical 
record.104 The professors claim the “principal problem” of genetic-specific statutes 
that afford special protection to genetic information is that they provide different 
privacy protections to two people with the same disease, the sole difference being 
one person’s disease is of genetic origin, while the other person’s disease is due to 
environmental or behavioral factors.105 Furthermore, strong protection of 
individual privacy may impede the collective social benefits that could be gained 
through enhanced patient choice, clinical benefits, improved research, and 
protection of public health.106 Professor Mark A. Rothstein also argues  
genetic-specific laws “have limited value in preventing or redressing harms caused 
by the uses and disclosures of genetic information” and supports general  
legal standards that more effectively deal with genetic-privacy and  
discrimination issues.107 
The genetic-exceptionalism debate obfuscates the goal of protecting genetic 
privacy. The binary portrayal of genetic information as exceptional or not 
“reinforces the assumption that tailored policies are only justified if genetic tests 
and information are globally exceptional.”108 Second, any perspective arguing for 
tailored policies can be discounted by arguing that genetic tests and information 
should not be treated differently than other personal and health information.109 
However, tailored laws, regulations, and policies are needed regarding DTC genetic 
testing due to its rapid and largely unregulated commercialization in the era of big 
 
102. KATHRYN C. MONTGOMERY, JEFF CHESTER & KATHARINA KOPP, CTR. FOR  
DIGIT. DEMOCRACY, HEALTH WEARABLE DEVICES IN THE BIG DATA ERA: ENSURING PRIVACY, 
SECURITY, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 14 (2017), https://www.democraticmedia.org/ 
sites/default/files/field/public/2016/aucdd_wearablesreport_final121516.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
HC3N-9SYQ]. 
103. See Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Genetic Privacy and the Law: An End to 
Genetic Exceptionalism, 40 JURIMETRICS 21 (1999); Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Exceptionalism and Legal 
Pragmatism, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS (SPECIAL SUPP.) 59 (2007). 
104. Gostin & Hodge, supra note 103, at 32–33. 
105. Id. at 33. Respondents argue that these critics of genetic exceptionalism “conflate certain 
practical challenges with the conceptual argument for genetic exceptionalism.” Samual A. Garner  
& Jiyeon Kim, The Privacy Risks of Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing: A Case Study of 23andMe and 
Ancestry, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1219, 1245 (2019). 
106. Gostin & Hodge, supra note 103, at 36–39. 
107. Rothstein, supra note 103, at 62. 
108. Garrison et al., supra note 100, at 53. 
109. Id. 
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data and personalized medicine. Some scholars have therefore argued for a new 
rhetorical term, “genomic contextualism,” to reframe the genetic exceptionalism 
debate.110 This term encapsulates the concept that the contexts where genetic 
information is used should guide policymaking.111 Accordingly, public perspectives 
on how genetic information is used and understood in social and physical 
environments should be considered in any effort to protect genetic privacy.112 
B. Consumer Perspectives 
In looking at consumer perspectives on general data privacy and privacy 
related to DTC genetic testing, certain attitudes and trends are clear. According to 
a 2019 Pew Research Center survey, 81% of Americans feel they have very little or 
no control over the data collected by companies.113 Similarly, 84% of Americans 
also feel they lack control over data collected by the government.114 Only 4–6% of 
Americans feel they understood what companies or the government are doing with 
their data.115 Notably, 70% of Americans feel their data is less secure today than it 
was five years ago.116 Roughly 80% of Americans think the risks of companies 
collecting data outweigh the benefits.117 Based on this research, it is clear consumers 
in the United States care about protecting their data privacy. 
Nevertheless, consumer perspectives on genetic privacy are less definitive. For 
example, among the 52% of consumers who stated they recently decided not to use 
a product or service because of concerns regarding personal-data collection, 21% 
of that group decided not to use websites, whereas 10% decided not to use DNA, 
financial, or health-care services.118 Furthermore, 48% of U.S. adults find it 
 
110. See id. at 57. The shift away from the binary genetic exceptionalism debate and the need 
for a nuanced approach based on context has subsequently been echoed by other scholars in the ethical, 
legal, and social implications field. See, e.g., Thomas H. Murray, Guest Editorial, Is Genetic 
Exceptionalism Past Its Sell-By Date? On Genomic Diaries, Context, and Content, AM. J. BIOETHICS,  
Jan. 2019, at 13, 15 (“[Genetic exceptionalism] served a purpose in its time as a counter against genetic 
determinism and the exaggerated fears it engendered. But it’s been pulled in so many, even 
contradictory, directions in recent years that its meaning and usefulness have dissipated.”); see also Müge 
Fazlioglu, Beyond the “Nature” of Data: Obstacles to Protecting Sensitive Information in the European 
Union and the United States, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 271, 300 (2019) (“Simply prioritizing certain 
‘categories’ of information without taking into account the context of use might be too blunt an 
approach to protect data subjects’ privacy.”). 
111. See Garrison et al., supra note 100, at 57. 
112. See id. 
113. BROOKE AUXIER, LEE RAINIE, MONICA ANDERSON, ANDREW PERRIN, MADHU 
KUMAR & ERICA TURNER, PEW RSCH. CTR., AMERICANS AND PRIVACY: CONCERNED, CONFUSED 




115. Id. at 10. 
116. Id. at 15. 
117. Id. at 28. 
118. Andrew Perrin, Half of Americans Have Decided Not to Use a Product or Service Because of 
Privacy Concerns, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/ 
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acceptable for DTC genetic testing companies to share users’ genetic data with law 
enforcement.119 A national survey of U.S. adults found 57% of respondents believed 
the federal government should spend more on research into genetic causes of 
disease, which shows Americans are generally receptive towards the goal of 
advancing scientific and medical knowledge.120 These findings seem to indicate that 
while consumers care about genetic privacy, they are willing to sacrifice some 
aspects of privacy in order to contribute to societal benefits such as improved law 
enforcement and scientific research. 
Not surprisingly, acceptance of certain trade-offs is more pronounced among 
consumers of DTC genetic testing. A Stanford University study based on qualitative 
interviews of 23andMe customers found they viewed their relationships with 
23andMe as transactionally focused but the possibility of contributing to 23andMe’s 
research programs “deepened their commitment and motivation towards their 
decision to participate.”121 These consumers had few immediate privacy concerns 
about the use of their DNA, but some believed there may be general or future 
concerns.122 Consumers have also consistently felt that people should have access 
to DTC genetic testing: a 2013 survey of Navigenics, 23andMe, and deCODEme 
consumers found 66% of respondents believed it was at least somewhat important 
that DTC genetic services be available without government oversight.123 A 2017 
study of 23andMe and Pathway Genomics consumers found 89.9% of participants 
believed people should have access to DTC genetic testing, with 68.3% believing 
test kits should be available more widely through outlets like drugstores.124 
The research findings discussed above demonstrate that while consumers are 
concerned about general data privacy, their perspectives are more varied when it 
comes to genetic privacy. While the nation at large is more cautious about DTC 
genetics than consumers who have already taken tests, both groups acknowledge 
certain societal benefits that may warrant fewer strict privacy protections. Such 
benefits include better law enforcement and the advancement of research. 




119. Andrew Perrin, About Half of Americans Are OK with DNA Testing Companies Sharing 
User Data with Law Enforcement, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Feb. 4, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2020/02/04/about-half-of-americans-are-ok-with-dna-testing-companies-sharing-user-data-with 
-law-enforcement [https://perma.cc/TR26-X4D8]. 
120. See Rene Almeling & Shana Kushner Gadarian, Brief Report, Public Opinion on Policy Issues 
in Genetics and Genomics, 16 GENETICS MED. 491, 492 (2014). 
121. Jennifer King, “Becoming Part of Something Bigger”: Direct to Consumer Genetic Testing, 
Privacy, and Personal Disclosure, PROC. ACM HUM.-COMPUT. INTERACTION, Nov. 2019, at 158:1, 
158:10 (2019). 
122. Id. 
123. Juli Murphy Bollinger, Robert C. Green & David Kaufman, Attitudes About Regulation 
Among Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Customers, 17 GENETIC TESTING & MOLECULAR 
BIOMARKERS 424, 425 (2013). 
124. Gollust et al., supra note 29, at 292, 305, 307. 
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balanced approach that gives consumers the ability to choose to protect data they 
deem sensitive. 
C. Electronic Agreements, Collection, and Use 
Currently, consumer autonomy over genetic information is eroded at three key 
stages of the DTC genetic testing process: when consumers sign electronic 
agreements with the companies, when DNA is collected, and when companies and 
third parties use consumer genetic information for their own purposes. Beyond the 
initial transaction of obtaining test results, numerous entities seek to access 
company databases, including data brokers, marketing and advertising corporations, 
pharmaceutical companies, employers, insurers, and law enforcement.125 Therefore, 
DTC genetic testing companies have an enormous incentive to aggregate data to 
the detriment of consumers. 
First, consumer autonomy is lost when individuals “sign” DTC genetic testing 
companies’ electronic agreements prior to testing. These agreements are typically 
“clickwrap” agreements, where a consumer is forced to scroll through before 
clicking “I agree,” or “browsewrap” agreements, where a consumer can access the 
terms through a hyperlink but clicking on the link is not required to enter into the 
contract.126 Due to the fast-paced nature of the online world and how often 
consumers encounter clickwrap and browsewrap agreements,127 many scholars have 
raised concerns that these agreements may not provide consumers with sufficient 
notice of companies’ data practices or afford them the opportunity for real choice 
or consent to those practices.128 
In one study that surveyed ninety DTC genetic testing companies operating in 
the United States, researchers found 10% of the companies had no readily accessible 
privacy documents such as privacy policies or terms of service.129 Additionally, 29% 
only had documents covering website use such as “cookie” and web-tracking 
policies.130 These two groups combined created an alarming percentage: 39% of 
 
125. Katherine Drabiak, Caveat Emptor: How the Intersection of Big Data and Consumer Genomics 
Exponentially Increases Information Privacy Risks, 27 HEALTH MATRIX 143, 171 (2017). 
126. Andelka M. Phillips, Reading the Fine Print When Buying Your Genetic Self  
Online: Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Terms and Conditions, 36 NEW GENETICS & SOC’Y 273,  
278 (2017). 
127. See AUXIER ET AL., supra note 113, at 5 (“About eight-in-ten Americans say they are asked 
to agree to a privacy policy at least monthly, including one-quarter who say this happens almost  
every day.”). 
128. See, e.g., Charles E. MacLean, It Depends: Recasting Internet Clickwrap, Browsewrap, “I 
Agree,” and Click-Through Privacy Clauses as Waivers of Adhesion, 65 CLEV. STATE L. REV. 45, 48–50 
(2016) (arguing that clickwrap agreements are adhesion contracts); Jonathan A. Obar & Anne  
Oeldorf-Hirsch, The Clickwrap: A Political Economic Mechanism for Manufacturing Consent on Social 
Media, SOC. MEDIA + SOC’Y, July–Sept. 2018, at 1, 9–10 (arguing that clickwrap agreements fail to 
notify users about the consent process, suggest that the consent process is unimportant, and discourage 
engagement with the consent process). 
129. Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 12, at 48. 
130. Id. 
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companies had no readily accessible documents applicable to genetic data.131 Thus, 
even if one argues that clickwrap and browsewrap agreements sufficiently establish 
consumer notice, choice, and consent, the fact that companies differ so widely in 
their privacy documents and transparency means different consumers will have 
different protections regarding their genetic information. 
Second, consumer autonomy is lost when companies collect consumer DNA 
in ways that are not fully transparent. Data collection issues concern what 
information is shared with the testing laboratory, how a consumer’s biological 
sample is treated after testing, for how long consumer genetic data is retained, and 
whether retained genetic data can be deleted.132 If genetic information is stored 
online in the cloud, such data is also vulnerable to security breaches. For example, 
a MyHeritage security researcher discovered over ninety-two million email 
addresses and hashed passwords had been transferred to a private server 
unaffiliated with the company over seven months after the initial data breach.133 
Even though genetic information was not leaked, this incident heightens the 
concern that consumer genetic information is of interest and vulnerable to hackers 
with inscrutable motives and affiliations. 
Third, consumer autonomy is lost when companies and third parties use 
consumer data. Data-use issues revolve around companies’ ability to own and 
commercialize consumer genetic information; internal research and development; 
sharing of data with third parties for external research; transferring of data in the 
event of a sale, merger, or bankruptcy; and sharing of data with law enforcement.134 
Examples of possible data misuse include GlaxoSmithKline’s purchase of a $300 
million stake in 23andMe that allowed it to use 23andMe’s genetic database to 
develop new drugs135 and the arrest of the Golden State Killer based off of genetic 
data from his family members found in a genealogy database.136 These examples 
show how companies and affiliated third parties may use genetic information in 
ways beyond what consumers likely believed they signed up for when they initially 
decided to test their DNA. 
Thus, the loss of consumer autonomy over genetic information occurs at three 
main stages: (1) when consumers encounter electronic agreements prior to testing, 
(2) when companies collect DNA and associated information, and (3) when 
 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 49–51. 
133. Press Release, MyHeritage, MyHeritage Statement About a Cybersecurity Incident (June 
4, 2018), https://blog.myheritage.com/2018/06/myheritage-statement-about-a-cybersecurity-incident 
[https://perma.cc/7DCR-E828 ]. 
134. See Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 12, at 52–53, 55–57. 
135. Jamie Ducharme, A Major Drug Company Now Has Access to 23andMe’s Genetic Data. 
Should You Be Concerned?, TIME ( July 26, 2018, 3:47 PM), https://time.com/5349896/23andme-
glaxo-smith-kline [https://perma.cc/UB43-HZVW]. 
136. Michael Levenson & Heather Murphy, Golden State Killer Suspect Offers to Plead Guilty, 
N.Y. TIMES ( June 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/04/us/golden-state-killer-trial.html 
[https://perma.cc/QF7G-HSJX]. 
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companies and third parties use that genetic information for various purposes 
beyond the original transaction. Companies vary drastically in their data practices, 
which unfortunately creates disparities in the levels of genetic-privacy protection 
consumers receive. The existence of these varying data practices demonstrates the 
need for an updated legal framework that allows individuals to regain control over 
their genetic information, particularly where consumers arguably did not consent to 
certain collection or use practices. 
III. THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Part II addressed privacy concerns and the corresponding loss of consumer 
autonomy within the DTC genetic testing industry. Part III reviews the current legal 
framework applicable to the industry and considers whether the current legal 
framework adequately protects consumer autonomy over genetic information. Part 
III argues the current legal framework is inadequate in preventing and remedying 
the loss of autonomy. However, recent general data-privacy laws from the states 
may provide a pathway to securing consumer autonomy regarding DTC  
genetic tests. 
A. Industry Self-Regulation 
This Section considers whether industry self-regulation is a viable method for 
the protection of consumer autonomy over genetic information. Self-regulation in 
the DTC genetic testing context takes two forms: contracts and best practices.137 
As previously discussed, the use of contracts in the form of clickwrap agreements, 
browsewrap agreements, privacy policies, or terms of service is highly skewed in 
favor of DTC genetic testing companies.138 This Section assesses the value of 
privacy best practices created with industry cooperation. 
The Future of Privacy Forum (FPF), a nonprofit organization that brings 
together industry, academia, law, and advocacy groups, put forth privacy best 
practices for DTC genetic testing companies in 2018.139 FPF acknowledges that 
“Genetic Data is sensitive information that warrants a high standard of privacy 
protection” due to its possibly identifying genetic predispositions, disease risks, and 
future medical conditions; revealing information about one’s family, including 
children; containing unexpected information; and being culturally significant for 
groups or individuals.140 FPF recommends that companies obtain express consent 
for collection, analysis, sharing, or reporting of genetic data; obtain informed 
 
137. See Phillips, supra note 126, at 273 (discussing the use of contracts by the DTC genetic 
testing industry as the “dominant means of industry self-regulation”); FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM, 
PRIVACY BEST PRACTICES FOR CONSUMER GENETIC TESTING SERVICES (2018), https://fpf.org/
wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Privacy-Best-Practices-for-Consumer-Genetic-Testing-Services-FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/34L5-JXE3] (establishing DTC genetic testing industry best practices). 
138. See supra Section II.C. 
139. FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM, supra note 137, at 19. 
140. Id. at 1. 
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consent for internal or external research; provide a method for consumers to access 
their genetic data through the services; and provide “clear and prominent methods” 
for consumers to delete their account, delete their genetic data, and destroy 
biological samples, with the exception of genetic data being used for active or 
completed research.141 
While the FPF best practices highlight important privacy-protection goals, 
these best practices are not legally enforceable. Companies superficially striving for 
compliance are not held responsible for failing to protect genetic privacy. For 
example, 23andMe, Ancestry, Helix, MyHeritage, Habit, and FamilyTreeDNA all 
initially supported the FPF best practices, but FamilyTreeDNA was notably 
removed as a supporter after it revealed in January 2019 that it had an agreement 
with the FBI to search its databases.142 Additionally, industry self-regulation is likely 
only achievable where ethical considerations align with every business’s end  
goal—profit maximization.143 Even though bigger companies such as 23andMe and 
Ancestry may be more inclined to follow these best practices due to heightened 
name recognition and the threat of consumer outrage,144 smaller companies are not 
subject to that same pressure.145 
Industry self-regulation has been found to be difficult to maintain in industries 
outside of DTC genetic testing. In a 2000 study, Professors Andrew A. King and 
Michael J. Lenox examined the performance of the Chemical Manufacturers 
Association’s Responsible Care Program, which required all members of the trade 
association to adopt over 100 management practices addressing interaction with the 
community, facilities management, and interaction with suppliers and customers.146 
Professors King and Lenox’s data suggests the program had “fallen victim to 
 
141. Id. at 4–8. 
142. Press Release, Future of Privacy Forum, Future of Privacy Forum and Leading Genetic 
Testing Companies Announce Best Practices to Protect Privacy of Consumer Genetic Data ( July 31, 
2018), https://fpf.org/blog/future-of-privacy-forum-and-leading-genetic-testing-companies-announce 
-best-practices-to-protect-privacy-of-consumer-genetic-data [https://perma.cc/YQQ4-9JNV]. 
143. See Garner & Kim, supra note 105, at 1261; Matthew Piehl, Regulating Hype and Hope: A 
Business Ethics Model Approach to Potential Oversight of Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Tests, 16  
MICH. STATE U. J. MED. & L. 59, 82 (2011); see also J. Lyn Entrikin, Family Secrets and Relational 
Privacy: Protecting Not-So-Personal, Sensitive Information from Public Disclosure, 74 U. MIA. L. REV. 781, 
867 (2020) (“While voluntary guidelines are a step in the right direction, they may not be enough to 
ensure that consumers are well informed about their rights to control access to their genetic data, 
including the rights they expressly waive . . . .”). 
144. See Eric Ravenscraft, How to Protect Your DNA Data Before and After Taking an at-Home 
Test, N.Y. TIMES ( June 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/12/smarter-living/how-to-
protect-your-dna-data.html [https://perma.cc/2HWX-FW64] (stating the “Big Three” companies, 
23andMe, Ancestry, and MyHeritage, generally allow consumers to delete their accounts and genetic 
data but will retain genetic data to comply with the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments). 
145. See Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 12, at 51 (finding of fifty-five companies with readily 
accessible privacy policies regarding genetic data, 44% (24 of 55) addressed deletion, and of the 44%, 
21% (5 of 24) explicitly allowed deletion of all genetic data, while one company did not allow for 
deletion at all). 
146. Andrew A. King & Michael J. Lenox, Industry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions: The 
Chemical Industry’s Responsible Care Program, 43 ACAD. MGMT. J. 698, 699 (2000). 
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enough opportunism that it include[d] a disproportionate number of poor 
performers, and its members [did] not improve faster than nonmembers.”147 In a 
subsequent study of four environmental self-regulatory programs in the chemical, 
textile, and pulp and paper industries, researchers found the inclusion of sanctioning 
mechanisms was critical for the functioning of industry self-regulation.148 
Such studies cut against proponents of industry self-regulation who argue  
self-regulation can control behavior through informal means, while supporting 
critics of self-regulation who posit industries lacking sanctioning mechanisms allow 
bad actors to disguise their poor performances and shirk the real effort required to 
meet set goals.149 Notably, the FPF is not a trade association that can monitor and 
expel members for failing to comply with best practices.150 The DTC genetic testing 
industry lacks a well-established trade association like the chemical industry’s 
Chemical Manufacturers Association.151 While the FPF best practices may outline 
important privacy-protection goals, enforceable regulatory mechanisms are needed 
to ensure the application of uniform standards and practices across the industry. 
B. The Courts 
Given the unenforceability of self-regulatory industry rules, this Note next 
assesses the current legal framework applicable to DTC genetic testing, beginning 
with the courts and the idea of a constitutional right to informational privacy. In 
Griswold v. Connecticut, the U.S. Supreme Court found an independent right to 
privacy in the “penumbras” of the U.S. Constitution.152 Subsequently in Whalen  
v. Roe, the Court described two different privacy interests, one involving “the 
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another [in the] 
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.”153 Whalen is the first 
Supreme Court case that articulated some form of a constitutional right to 
informational privacy,154 which was later supported in Nixon v. Administrator of 
General Services.155 However, in National Aeronautics & Space Administration  
 
147. Id. at 713. 
148. Michael J. Lenox & Jennifer Nash, Industry Self-Regulation and Adverse Selection: A 
Comparison Across Four Trade Association Programs, 12 BUS. STRATEGY & ENV’T 343, 344, 354 (2003). 
149. King & Lenox, supra note 146, at 700–01. 
150. FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM, supra note 137, at 19. 
151. King & Lenox, supra note 146, at 699 (explaining that the Chemical Manufacturers 
Association, established in 1872, is the “oldest and most prominent trade association of the  
U.S. chemical industry”). 
152. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
153. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977). A constitutional right to information privacy 
is founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty. Id. at 598 n.23. 
154. See id. at 599 & n.25 (citing Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277  
U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) in support of “the individual interest in avoiding 
disclosure of personal matters,” where Justice Brandeis characterized “the right to be let alone” as “the 
right most valued by civilized men”). 
155. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 455–57 (1977) (citing to “the individual 
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters” as articulated in Whalen, although ultimately holding 
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v. Nelson, the Court retreated from reaffirming the right, instead stating that it would 
“assume for [the purposes of the case] that the Government’s challenged inquiries 
implicate a privacy interest of constitutional significance.”156 The federal circuit 
courts have since been split on broadly or narrowly interpreting the right.157 
Despite the Supreme Court’s tentative recognition of the need for 
informational privacy, it is unlikely that a genetic information privacy right 
applicable to DTC genetic testing can be obtained through the federal courts. 
Importantly, the right to privacy under the U.S. Constitution is limited to state 
action.158 Since DTC genetic testing companies are not governmental actors,159 they 
fall outside the purview of the constitutional right to information privacy. 
Furthermore, the public function exception160 and the entanglement exception161 to 
the state action doctrine likely cannot be applied to DTC genetic testing companies, 
as these companies are not taking on a governmental role and the government is 
not involved in encouraging industry conduct. 
Consequently, plaintiffs seeking to enforce their privacy interests in the courts 
have sought to file class action lawsuits, which are now on the rise.162 However, 
Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc.—the class action case precipitated by the FDA’s 2013 
cease-and-desist notification to 23andMe—demonstrates the limitations of contract 
law in protecting consumers.163 Even though the lawsuit involved serious class 
action claims regarding false advertising, unfair competition, and consumer 
protection,164 the Ninth Circuit held that the case must proceed to arbitration 
because 23andMe’s arbitration agreement in its Terms of Service was not 
unconscionable.165 The case ultimately settled, and class members were given the 
 
the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act did not unconstitutionally violate former 
President Richard M. Nixon’s right of privacy). 
156. Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 147 (2011). 
157. See Larry J. Pittman, The Elusive Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy, 19  
NEV. L.J. 135, 167 (2018). 
158. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (“[T]he action inhibited by the first 
section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States. 
The Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory  
or wrongful.”). 
159. See id. 
160. There is state action where a private entity exercises powers traditionally exclusively 
reserved to the state. See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974). 
161. There is also state action where the government has authorized, encouraged, or facilitated 
private conduct. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619–20 (1991). 
162. See Nancy R. Thomas, Zachary Maldonado & Ani Oganesian, Privacy Litigation 2020 Year 
in Review: Data Breach Litigation, MORRISON FOERSTER ( Jan. 4, 2021), https://www.mofo.com/
resources/insights/210104-data-breach-litigation-2020.html [https://perma.cc/DP6G-8X4G]. 
163. See Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc., 840 F.3d 1016, 1033 (9th Cir. 2016). 
164. Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc., No. 5:13-CV-05682-LHK, 2014 WL 2903752, at *3  
(N.D. Cal. June 25, 2014), aff’d, 840 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2016). 
165. Tompkins, 840 F.3d at 1033. 
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choice of receiving $12.50 in cash for each personal genome service purchased or a 
certificate for forty dollars off a future purchase of a genetic testing kit.166 
Some scholars have advocated for the use of the courts in addressing  
genetic-privacy violations by arguing for the use of tort liability for genetic-privacy 
violations167 and property rights over genetic information.168 While these theories 
may help individuals pursue privacy litigation, they are not likely to help larger 
groups of people in protecting their genetic privacy. At the outset, privacy litigation 
plaintiffs trying to sue in federal court may find it difficult to establish an  
injury-in-fact to support Article III standing.169 Class certification according to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be challenging to meet,170 and related case law 
 
166. Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement and Release, Ex. 2 at 1, Davis-Hudson  
v. 23andMe, Inc., AAA Case No. 74-20-1400-0032 (2017) [hereinafter Stipulation and Agreement ]. See 
generally Settlement Approval Order and Final Award, Davis-Hudson v. 23andMe, Inc., AAA Case  
No. 74-20-1400-0032 (2017). 
167. See Ifeoma Ajunwa, Genetic Testing Meets Big Data: Tort and Contract Law Issues, 75 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1225, 1257–61 (2014) (advocating for a tort of genetic-information disclosure); see also Benjamin 
Sundholm, Strict Liability for Genetic Privacy Violations in the Age of Big Data, 49  
U. MEM. L. REV. 759, 797–98 (2019) (supporting a strict-liability regime that will deter risky behavior 
while providing compensation to acknowledge wrongs to victims of genetic-privacy violations). But see 
Helen C. Dick, Comment, Risk and Responsibility: State Regulation and Enforcement of the  
Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Industry, 6 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 167, 171–72 (arguing 
the tort system is incapable of regulating the DTC genetic testing industry because of procedural 
difficulties and the technical, yet unsettled, nature of the technology); Garner & Kim, supra note 105, 
at 1234 (“[T]he utility of privacy torts in this area is unclear because there is currently no legal precedent 
recognizing these torts for consumers’ genetic information from DTC-GT companies.”). 
168. Tufik Y. Shayeb, You Are What You Own: Reopening the Discussion on Universally 
Recognizing a Property Right in Genetic Information and Material, 38 WHITTIER L. REV. 181, 205–07 
(2017) (advocating for a property right in genetic materials and information to confer the rights to 
exclude, use, enjoy, and alienate one’s own information); see G. Alex Sinha, A Real-Property Model of 
Privacy, 68 DEPAUL L. REV. 567, 588 (2019) (“[P]rivacy rights should be understood as rights of control 
over the private sphere that resemble rights of control over real property.”). But see Lothar Determann, 
Healthy Data Protection, 26 MICH. TECH. L. REV. 229, 269 (2020) (rejecting property rights in data 
because they would not promote innovation or other public goods and would not benefit individuals 
but would limit free speech, information freedom, science, commerce, and technological progress); 
Anya E.R. Prince, Comprehensive Protection of Genetic Information: One Size Privacy or Property Models 
May Not Fit All, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 175, 186, 188, 191–92 (2013) (highlighting how courts have 
expressed distaste for treating human body parts as property, the difficulty that a property interest in 
genetic data may create dual ownership of information, and the potential for a property interest to 
hamper research by requiring researchers to follow a chain of title in each piece of genetic  
data obtained). 
169. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (“To establish injury in fact, a 
plaintiff must show that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete 
and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” (quoting Lujan  
v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)); id. at 1549 (“Congress’ role in identifying and elevating 
intangible harms does not mean that a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement 
whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to 
vindicate that right.”). 
170. See, e.g., Cole v. Gene by Gene, Ltd., 735 F. App’x 368, 369–70 (9th Cir. 2018) (affirming 
the district court’s order denying class certification due to the wide variance of damages available under 
Alaska’s Genetic Privacy Act, distinct and individualized issues of the class, limited resources saved 
through certification, and the absence of pending or duplicative lawsuits). 
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may impede the impact of class actions.171 Even if class certification can be met, 
class action cases can proceed too slowly for plaintiffs.172 As seen in Tompkins, 
settlements do not sufficiently compensate victims through class action  
lawsuits: the final settlement term of $12.50 in cash for each purchase of a personal 
genome service product is likely not adequate given the gravity of the harms 
alleged.173 Finally, in the interest of maintaining privacy in the digital age, it would 
be more effective and efficient to prevent harm than to remedy it in the courts after 
damage has been done. 
C. Agency Regulation 
Several federal agencies have jurisdiction to regulate the DTC genetic testing 
industry.174 The FDA has jurisdiction under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 
1976 (FDCA) to regulate genetic tests as medical devices.175 The Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has authority under the Clinical Laboratory 
Improvement Amendments (CLIA) to regulate laboratory testing that is performed 
on human materials in the United States.176 Finally, the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) has jurisdiction through the Federal Trade Commission Act to regulate unfair 
or deceptive trade practices.177 
In terms of being able to comprehensively regulate DTC genetic companies, 
each agency has its weaknesses. First, the CMS cannot be a strong regulator for 
genetic privacy because CLIA standards focus on clinical testing quality.178 
Laboratories that perform high-complexity tests, such as certain Ancestry and 
 
171. See, e.g., Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 590, 596 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding 
the district court abused its discretion in certifying a class under one state’s consumer protection law 
because there were material differences with other state consumer protection laws). 
172. Class actions take, on average, between two to three years to resolve, but they can last as 
long as twenty years, as was the case in the class action suits arising out of the Exxon Valdez oil spill. 
How Long Does a Class Action Take?, CLASSACTION.ORG, https://www.classaction.org/learn/how-
long-it-takes [https://perma.cc/L83F-LQNN] ( last visited Oct. 24, 2021). 
173. See Stipulation and Agreement, supra note 166. 
174. Stephanie Bair, Article, Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing: Learning from the Past and 
Looking Toward the Future, 67 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 413, 426–29 (2012). 
175. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)(2) (defining “device” as an article “intended for use in the diagnosis 
of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or 
other animals”). 
176. See 42 U.S.C. § 263a (listing requirements regarding the certification of laboratories). 
177. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (empowering the FTC to prevent entities “from using unfair methods of 
competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or  
affecting commerce”). 
178. See Bair, supra note 174, at 431; Regulation of Genetic Tests, NAT’L HUM. GENOME  
RSCH. INST., https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/policy-issues/Regulation-of-Genetic-Tests 
[https://perma.cc/LHF4-BBA5] (Sept. 25, 2020). 
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23andMe tests,179 must secure certification to be compliant with CLIA.180 The CMS 
arguably contributes to the difficulty in protecting genetic privacy because records 
of these tests must be retained for at least two years.181 Even though well-known 
DTC genetic companies such as 23andMe, Ancestry, and MyHeritage are more 
likely to be protective of consumer data and honor any consumer deletion requests, 
certain data must still be kept for regulatory compliance since these companies used 
CLIA-certified laboratories.182 
Second, the FTC is not a reliable regulatory channel for securing genetic 
privacy because its role is centered on preventing misleading advertising.183 For 
example, the FTC announced enforcement actions in 2014 against GeneLink, Inc., 
and its former subsidiary for deceptive advertising, where the companies claimed 
their genetically personalized nutritional supplements could treat diabetes, heart 
disease, arthritis, insomnia, and other diseases.184 The FTC also claimed the 
companies failed to secure the personal information of nearly 30,000 consumers, 
which included genetic information, Social Security numbers, bank account 
information, and credit card numbers.185 As part of the settlements, the companies 
were required to establish and maintain comprehensive information security 
programs and submit to biennial security audits.186 Even though these requirements 
demonstrate the FTC can regulate some privacy issues, the GeneLink case shows 
the FTC’s regulation must be tied to companies’ misrepresentation of their privacy 
and security practices.187 Thus, privacy is secondary to the core issue of deceptive 
advertising. 
 
179. A search for “Illumina,” the maker of 23andMe’s DTC genetic tests, see Genotyping Services 
for Research, supra note 56, in the CLIA database showed that 23andMe’s tests are all considered “high 




ed&pagenum=50 [https://perma.cc/6H84-6PZQ] (Oct. 18, 2021). 
180. 42 C.F.R. § 493.25 (2019). 
181. See 42 C.F.R. § 493.1105 (2019). 
182. See Ravenscraft, supra note 144. 
183. See Ellen Wright Clayton, Barbara J. Evans, James W. Hazel & Mark A. Rothstein, The 
Law of Genetic Privacy: Applications, Implications, and Limitations, 6 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 1, 19 (2019) 
(“A relatively low baseline of protection is provided by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which 
has broad authority to police ‘unfair’ or ‘deceptive’ business practices under the century-old Federal 
Trade Commission Act. Despite this authority, the FTC has rarely taken action against DTC genetic 
testing companies.”). 
184. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Companies Pitching Genetically Customized 





187. See id. 
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Third, the FDA is also not suitable for securing genetic privacy, even though 
it has had the most interaction with DTC genetic testing companies.188 Under the 
FDCA, the FDA would classify a DTC genetic test that is not an ancestry test,  
low-risk general wellness test, or carrier screening test189 as either a Class I  
(low-risk), II (medium-risk), or III (high-risk) medical device; this determines 
whether a company needs to obtain premarket approval from the FDA before 
placing a product on the market.190 DTC genetic tests have historically avoided 
being classified as Class III devices through the laboratory-developed test exception 
that encompasses tests developed in-house by the company offering the service.191 
Even as the industry grew, the FDA continued to exercise its “enforcement 
discretion” regarding laboratory-developed tests, thereby exempting DTC genetic 
tests from the requirement of premarket approval since at least the early 1990s.192 
It was not until 2010 that the FDA sent out letters to various companies stating that 
their tests were medical devices that had not been subject to premarket review and 
approval.193 Even then, the FDA seems to have relented to the industry by 
authorizing for marketing many of 23andMe’s health-related DTC genetic tests.194 
The three main agencies currently regulating the DTC genetic testing industry 
thus do not regulate on a comprehensive level and do not squarely address  
genetic-privacy concerns. Like the courts, agencies should play an important role in 
the legal framework governing genetic privacy through enforcement of the law. 
However, both the courts and regulatory agencies need new and specific directives 
through legislation to begin directly tackling genetic-privacy issues. 
D. Legislation 
Having surveyed the drawbacks of regulation through the DTC genetic testing 
industry, courts, and agencies, legislation remains the most promising pathway to 
securing better genetic-privacy protections for consumers. Current federal and 
traditional state laws do not adequately protect against the loss of autonomy over 
genetic information. To begin with, current federal data-protection laws are industry 
 
188. See supra Section I.D. 
189. The FDA recognizes six types of DTC genetic tests. Direct-to-Consumer Tests, supra note 
2. Ancestry tests that explore family history and low-risk general wellness tests that predict traits like 
athletic ability are not regulated by the FDA, and carrier screening tests identifying genes that could be 
passed on to future children are exempt from FDA premarket review. Id. The other three types of tests 
are substantially health-related and regulated by the FDA: genetic health risk tests calculate an 
individual’s risk for certain medical diseases or conditions, pharmacogenetic tests determine an 
individual’s reaction to drugs, and cancer predisposition tests gauge an individual’s risk for getting 
certain kinds of cancer. Id. 
190. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1). 
191. Bair, supra note 174, at 429. 
192. See Jessica Elizabeth Palmer, Genetic Gatekeepers: Regulating Direct-to-Consumer Genomic 
Services in an Era of Participatory Medicine, 67 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 475, 500 (2012). 
193. See supra Section I.D. 
194. Id. 
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specific.195 Among these laws, there are two federal laws that directly cover genetic 
information: the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)196 
and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA).197 HIPAA’s Privacy 
Rule regulates the use and disclosure of protected health information for treatment, 
payment, or health-care operations by certain covered entities and business 
associates.198 Unfortunately, HIPAA does not cover DTC genetic testing companies 
because they are neither covered entities nor business associates as defined under 
the Act.199 
On the other hand, GINA is an antidiscrimination statute that is split into two 
parts.200 Title I prohibits genetic discrimination in health insurance.201 Under Title 
I, group health plans and a health-insurance issuer in connection with a group health 
plan are prohibited from establishing rules for eligibility or adjusting premiums on 
the basis of genetic information, requiring genetic testing, and collecting genetic 
information.202 Title II prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of genetic 
information.203 Under Title II, employers are prohibited from discriminating against 
or segregating employees based on genetic information, and they also cannot require 
genetic information of their employees.204 Scholars have pointed out GINA’s main 
drawback is its limitations to the health insurance and employment contexts.205 
Current federal laws relating to genetic privacy are thus limited by their 
definitions and scope. Furthermore, Congress has historically been slow to pass 
genetic-privacy legislation, as the first version of GINA was introduced in 1995, 
 
195. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Towards A Global Data Privacy Standard, 71 
FLA. L. REV. 365, 381 (2019). 
196. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 
Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
197. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.). 
198. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.506 (2019) (HIPAA Privacy Rule); see also 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2019) 
(“A covered entity may be a business associate of another covered entity.”). 
199. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2019) (defining “covered entity”); id. (defining  
“business associate”). 
200. See 122 Stat. at 883, 905. 
201. 29 U.S.C. § 1182. 
202. Id. 
203. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1. 
204. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a)–(b). 
205. See Bradley A. Areheart & Jessica L. Roberts, GINA, Big Data, and the Future of Employee 
Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 710, 725 (2019) (“From a practical perspective, GINA’s limited coverage means 
that a significant portion of genetic-privacy invasions and discrimination goes unregulated. In most 
states, for example, it is perfectly legal for banks, landlords, schools and even life insurers to make 
decisions based on genetic information.”); Leslie E. Wolf, Erin Fuse Brown, Ryan Kerr, Genevieve 
Razick, Gregory Tanner, Brett Duvall, Sakinah Jones, Jack Brackney & Tatiana Posada, The Web of 
Legal Protections for Participants in Genomic Research, 29 HEALTH MATRIX 1, 36 (2019) (“GINA’s 
protections contain notable gaps. First, the employer provisions of GINA only apply to employers with 
15 or more employees . . . . Second, GINA’s insurance provisions only apply to health insurers and do 
not apply to other forms of insurance . . . .”). 
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twelve years before it passed in the House of Representatives.206 The most recent 
effort targeting DTC genetic testing is S. 24, titled the “Protecting Personal Health 
Data Act,” which is a Senate bill introduced in January 2021 aimed at regulating 
“consumer devices, services, applications, and software” including DTC genetic 
testing services.207 This bill has only been introduced in the 117th Congress  
(2021–2022); an identical Senate version and a separate House bill both failed to 
progress past their introductions during the 116th Congress (2019–2020).208 These 
examples demonstrate the difficulty in passing federal genetic-privacy legislation. 
While genetic-privacy bills have languished in Congress, states have enacted a 
variety of statutes that address the issue. There are three traditional approaches to 
creating state genetic-privacy laws.209 First, genetic notice or informed-consent laws 
impose restrictions on initial collection activities such as collecting DNA samples, 
analyzing DNA samples, and retaining data from the initial analysis.210 Second, 
genetic antidiscrimination laws restrict the ability of insurers and employers to 
require genetic testing or information or make decisions based on genetic 
information.211 Third, genetic redisclosure laws require companies to obtain consent 
from individuals before their genetic information is shared with a third party or 
confer explicit ownership rights to individuals over their data.212 Notably, one study 
found that state approaches giving users control over redisclosure  
encouraged genetic testing, while notice or informed-consent models deterred  
genetic testing.213 
The traditional state approaches cannot adequately remedy situations where 
genetic information ends up in the hands of a third party without consumers’ 
informed consent or where informed consent is illusory. In other words, 
comprehensive genetic-privacy protection requires additional rights that promote 
consumers’ direct autonomy over their genetic information. Even though both 
federal and state genetic-privacy laws fall short on this front, there has been 
 
206. See Timeline of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), NAT’L  
HUM. GENOME RSCH. INST., https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/policy-issues/timeline-
genetic-information-nondiscrimination-act-GINA [https://perma.cc/US49-RFNS] (Sept. 16, 2020). 
207. Protecting Personal Health Data Act, S. 24, 117th Cong. § 4 (2021). 
208. See S.24 - Protecting Personal Health Data Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress. 
gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/24 [https://web.archive.org/web/20210430023123/https:// 
www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/24 ] ( last visited Oct. 24, 2021); S.1842 - Protecting 
Personal Health Data Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-
bill/1842 [https://web.archive.org/web/20210605173633/https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-
congress/senate-bill/1842 ] ( last visited Oct. 24, 2021); H.R.2155 - Genetic Information Privacy 
Act of 2019, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/2155 [https:// 
web.archive.org/web/20201211184943/https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/ 
2155 ] ( last visited Oct. 24, 2021). 
209. See Amalia R. Miller & Catherine Tucker, Privacy Protection, Personalized Medicine, and 
Genetic Testing, 64 MGMT. SCI. 4648, 4653, 4653 tbl.2 (2018). 
210. Id. at 4653 tbl.2. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. 
213. Id. at 4665. 
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promising movement towards general data-privacy laws that give consumers control 
over their data, especially at the state level.214 For example, general data-privacy 
legislation in California, the CCPA215 and the recently passed CPRA,216 may rise to 
the challenge of protecting genetic privacy and serve as model legislation for other 
states and the federal government. 
1. The CCPA 
The CCPA has been called the “most stringent state regulation addressing data 
privacy in the United States.”217 Passed in 2018 with overwhelming support in both 
California’s State Assembly and Senate,218 the CCPA returns control over personal 
information to consumers from businesses that collect personal information by 
providing new privacy rights, including (1) the right to know what personal 
information is collected, used, and shared; (2) the right to delete collected personal 
information, with exceptions;219 (3) the right to opt out of the sale of personal 
information; and (4) the right to nondiscrimination for exercising privacy rights.220 
These rights only apply to California residents221 and only regulate for-profit 
businesses that do business in California and (1) have annual gross revenues of over 
twenty-five million dollars; (2) buy, receive, sell, or share for commercial purposes 
the personal information of fifty thousand or more California residents, 
households, or devices; or (3) derive fifty percent or more of their annual revenue 
from selling California residents’ personal information.222 
 
214. See 2020 Consumer Data Privacy Legislation, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES  
( Jan. 17, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/
2020-consumer-data-privacy-legislation637290470.aspx [https://perma.cc/A7TU-D6CD]. As for 
federal general data-privacy legislation, some argue that the likelihood of a federal law passing is 
increasing due to bipartisan and industry support. See, e.g., Mabel Crescioni & Tara Sklar, The Research 
Exemption Carve Out: Understanding Research Participants Rights Under GDPR and U.S. Data Privacy 
Laws, 60 JURIMETRICS J. 125, 136 (2020). 
215. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–.199 (2018). 
216. See Aaron Holmes, California Just Passed a Major Privacy Law that Will Make It Harder 
for Facebook and Google to Track People and Gather Data, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 4, 2020, 10:34 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/prop-24-privacy-california-data-tracking-facebook-google-2020-11 
[https://perma.cc/B293-4QQ8]. 
217. Heather Whitehead, The Pandemic, Proposed Federal Privacy Regulation and the CCPA, 
JDSUPRA (Oct. 29, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-pandemic-proposed-federal-
privacy-52186 [https://perma.cc/D53U-PR7H]. 
218. See AB-375 Privacy: Personal Information: Businesses., CAL. LEGIS. INFO., https://
leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billVotesClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB375 [https://perma.cc/ 
6XUM-KYNE] ( last visited Oct. 24, 2021). For a brief history of the CCPA and subsequent 
amendments, see California Consumer Privacy Act Basics, PRIV. RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE ( Jan. 6, 2020), 
https://privacyrights.org/resources/california-consumer-privacy-act-basics#:~:text=The%20CCPA 
%20began%20as%20a,Bill%20375%20(AB%20375). 
219. See discussion infra Sections IV.B.2.b, IV.B.2.c. 
220. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100, .105, .110, .115, .120, .125. 
221. § 1798.140(g). 
222. § 1798.140(c)(1). 
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Personal information is defined as “information that identifies, relates to, 
describes, is reasonably capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be 
linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household.”223 Personal 
information includes biometric information224 that is further defined as “an 
individual’s physiological, biological, or behavioral characteristics, including an 
individual’s deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), that can be used, singly or in 
combination with each other or with other identifying data, to establish individual 
identity.”225 Criticisms of the CCPA include that it does not separately define or 
categorize “sensitive data” and does not provide special rules for collecting and 
sharing biometric data.226 However, the passing of the CPRA cures many of the 
supposed faults of the CCPA.227 
2. The CPRA 
The CPRA, which will become operative on January 1, 2023,228 overhauls 
much of the CCPA that is potentially applicable to genetic information. First, the 
CPRA establishes a new category of “sensitive personal information” that expressly 
includes a consumer’s genetic data.229 It also changes what businesses are to be 
regulated to those (1) with annual gross revenues of over twenty-five million dollars; 
(2) that buy, sell, or share the personal information of one hundred thousand or 
more consumers or households; or (3) that derive fifty percent or more of their 
annual revenue from selling or sharing consumers’ personal information.230 The 
CPRA builds upon the right to delete in the CCPA by requiring businesses to notify 
service providers, contractors, and third parties to whom the businesses have sold 
or shared personal information to delete consumers’ personal information from 
their records upon receipt of a verifiable consumer request.231 The CPRA also 
contains a new privacy right to limit the use and disclosure of sensitive  
personal information.232 
 
223. § 1798.140(o)(1). 
224. § 1798.140(o)(1)(E). 
225. § 1798.140(b). 
226. See, e.g., DATAGUIDANCE & FUTURE OF PRIV. F., COMPARING PRIVACY LAWS: GDPR 
V. CCPA 15 (2018), https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/GDPR_CCPA_Comparison-
Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/VXY9-PJW3]. 
227. See Brian H. Lam, California Privacy Rights Act Passes - Dramatically Altering the CCPA, 
NAT’L L. REV. (Nov. 6, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/california-privacy-rights-act-
passes-dramatically-altering-ccpa [https://perma.cc/BN9B-BE6P]. 
228. California Privacy Rights Act of 2020, sec. 31(a), 2020 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 24 (amending 
portions of CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100–.199). 
229. See sec. 14, § 1798.140(ae)(1)(F). 
230. § 1798.140(d)(1). Subdivision A clarified the time period for determining annual gross 
revenue; subdivision B eliminated the requirement that the buying, selling, or sharing of personal 
information be for commercial purposes but increased the threshold number of consumers or 
households from 50,000 to 100,000; and subdivision C added the sharing of personal information where 
the original CCPA only specified the selling of personal information. Id. 
231. Sec. 5, § 1798.105(c). 
232. Sec. 10, § 1798.121(a). 
Clean Final Edit_Gassner_V2.docx (Do Not Delete) 11/8/21  8:20 AM 
300 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:267 
Businesses that control the collection of personal information must inform 
consumers as to the length of time of retention of the personal information and are 
prohibited from retaining it for longer than is reasonably necessary for the original 
disclosed purpose of collection.233 Originally in the CCPA,234 there is also a private 
right of action in the CPRA that allows consumers whose nonencrypted or 
nonredacted personal information, email addresses and passwords, or security 
questions and answers were compromised to sue businesses for damages, injunctive 
relief, or declaratory relief.235 Finally, the CPRA establishes the California Privacy 
Protection Agency, which will perform administrative enforcement for privacy 
violations.236 The revenue from administrative fines will be deposited in the 
Consumer Privacy Fund to offset costs incurred by state courts, the Attorney 
General, and the California Privacy Protection Agency.237 
The CPRA builds upon the data-privacy framework established in the CCPA 
and appears to be a promising and comprehensive legislation that is directly 
applicable to genetic privacy. It may very well become a framework that will inspire 
other states, or even Congress, in drafting future data-privacy legislation. However, 
closer analysis is required to identify areas appropriate for regulation in the DTC 
genetic testing context to ensure genetic privacy is adequately protected, while not 
stifling legitimate governmental and business interests. 
IV. REGAINING AUTONOMY OVER GENETIC INFORMATION 
Part III highlighted how the current legal framework inadequately remedies 
the loss of individual autonomy over genetic information, with the exception that 
the CCPA and the CPRA may bring much needed genetic-privacy protection. Part 
IV first cautions against a rushed federal solution given recent legislative 
developments in California. Part IV then recommends ways to reestablish consumer 
autonomy over genetic information under the CPRA, highlights the importance of 
a right to delete, and discusses limitations of such a right. 
A. Caution Against Rushing to a Federal Solution 
Scholars and reporters have advocated for a federal law governing genetic 
privacy or data privacy in general.238 The primary downside of state legislation is the 
 
233. Sec. 4, § 1798.100(a)(3). 
234. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150 (2018). 
235. California Privacy Rights Act of 2020, sec. 16, § 1798.150(a). 
236. Sec. 24, § 1798.199.10. 
237. Sec. 17, § 1798.155. There is a maximum fine of $2,500 for each violation and a maximum 
fine of $7,500 for each intentional violation or violation involving the personal information of a 
consumer whom the business actually knows is under 16 years of age. 
238. See, e.g., Clayton et al., supra note 183, at 32 (“Despite repeated calls from legal scholars and 
government advisory committees for increased oversight . . . no comprehensive federal laws currently 
prohibit [surreptitious testing].”); Crescioni & Sklar, supra note 214, at 133; Bastien Inzaurralde, The 
Technology 202: Consumers Advocates Want Washington to Tackle ‘Wild West’ of DNA Test Kits,  
WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-
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creation of a “patchwork” system of laws.239 The variety of state laws means 
different citizens’ genetic information will be more or less protected based on which 
state they live in, while also discouraging large, multi-state public genomic 
research.240 This suggests a broader federal law applicable to all states would be the 
most ideal in order to protect genetic privacy and autonomy across  
U.S. jurisdictions. 
However, with the passing of both the CCPA and CPRA in California, there 
may be reason for pause. First, states have often been called the “laboratories of 
democracy,” providing different solutions to common problems without affecting 
the rest of the country.241 The CCPA, widely considered to be the most stringent 
state privacy law in the United States, and the CPRA, which builds upon the 
CCPA,242 represent such an opportunity. How the CCPA and CPRA play out in the 
next couple of years will allow legislators to assess the pros and cons of CCPA- or 
CPRA-like privacy laws, including how they interact with key players such as 
companies, regulators, and consumers, and whether consumer autonomy over 
privacy is adequately protected. Further observation will allow future state laws, and 
an eventual federal data-privacy law, to be better tailored to the contexts in which 
the laws will govern. 
Second, there is a cautionary reason for not jumping directly to federal law as 
the solution. Any federal law may preempt state law where “Congress’ command is 
explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its structure and 
purpose.”243 Currently, various federal data-privacy proposals have failed to agree 
in three key areas, one being whether to preempt state privacy laws, the others being 
which federal agency would have enforcement power and whether to provide a 
private right of action.244 A weak federal law that inadequately protects data privacy, 
including genetic privacy, and preempts strong state laws would be more of a 
detriment to consumer data privacy and autonomy. Consequently, proponents of 
federal data-privacy protection should heavily scrutinize various federal proposals 




239. See Clayton et al., supra note 183, at 32; Gostin & Hodge, supra note 103, at 45. 
240. See John M. Conley, Adam K. Doerr & Daniel B. Vorhaus, Enabling Responsible Public 
Genomics, 20 HEALTH MATRIX 325, 369 (2010). 
241. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
242. See Anna Mercado Clark & Mario Fadi Ayoub, California Law Expands the California 
Consumer Privacy Act, LEXOLOGY (Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=0e0e4762-efec-4942-a87b-483babf1d45e [https://perma.cc/EL2H-RXY7]. 
243. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992). 
244. JONATHAN M. GAFFNEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10441, WATCHING THE  
WATCHERS: A COMPARISON OF PRIVACY BILLS IN THE 116TH CONGRESS 1 (2020), https://
crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10441 [https://web.archive.org/web/20210615100 
116/https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10441 ]. 
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of state law or a comprehensive federal solution where preemption would be less 
of an issue.245 
Third, California holds substantial influence over the rest of the country, and 
the CCPA and CPRA may have far-reaching effects beyond the borders of the 
state.246 California has a $3.1 trillion economy, which would be the fifth largest in 
the world if it were a country, ranking between Germany and the United 
Kingdom.247 Many of the big-data companies subject to the CCPA and CPRA, 
including 23andMe, are located in Silicon Valley, California.248 These companies 
may find it easier to comply with the CCPA and CPRA and extend compliance 
across their platforms no matter where they do business, as it is more challenging 
to comply with potentially fifty different state laws than one stringent state law.249 
California also has a notable track record of influencing lawmakers in other states 
on topics ranging from the environment250 to the minimum wage.251 Therefore, 
strong privacy legislation passed in California holds the promise of not only helping 
protect others in different states but also serving as model legislation for other states 
and the federal government to follow. 
 
245. California Attorney General Xavier Becerra has advocated for the former option. Letter 
from Xavier Becerra, Att’y Gen., State of California, to Roger Wicker, Chairman, U.S. Senate  
Comm. on Com., Sci., & Transp., Maria Cantwell, Ranking Member, U.S. Senate Comm. on Com.,  
Sci., & Transp., Frank Pallone, Jr., Chairman, U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on Energy  
& Com. & Greg Walden, Ranking Member, U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on Energy  
& Com. (Feb. 25, 2020), https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press-docs/Letter%20to%20 
Congress%20on%20CCPA%20preemption.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZH2W-8RKV]. 
246. Maryam Casbarro, Monder Khoury & Rachel Marmor, “Copycat CCPA” Bills Introduced 
in States Across Country, JDSUPRA (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/copycat-ccpa-
bills-introduced-in-states-20533 [https://perma.cc/2Q4C-FBLE]. 
247. California, FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/places/ca/?sh=6d52b81f3fef [https:// 
perma.cc/4NDF-B92G] (Dec. 2019). 
248. See, e.g., 23andMe Inc, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/profile/company/
8142214Z:US [https://perma.cc/V9JF-CM59] ( last visited Oct. 24, 2021) (stating headquarters are in 
Mountain View, California). 





250. Dan Jacobson, California Calls for All New Cars to Be Zero Emission by 2035, the State’s 
Latest Bold Action on Climate, ENV’T AM. (Oct. 6, 2020), https://environmentamerica.org/ 
blogs/environment-america-blog/ame/california-calls-all-new-cars-be-zero-emission-2035-state%E2 
%80%99s [https://perma.cc/S5RY-EAJD] (“Policies in place in other states make it more likely that 
they will follow California’s lead. Twelve other states, plus Washington, D.C., have adopted Clean Car 
Standards based on California’s.”). 
251. Natalie Sherman, How California Is Changing the US, BBC (Oct. 16, 2018), https://
www.bbc.com/news/business-45767736 [https://perma.cc/6P6G-UPN6] (“In recent years, 
[California] has passed a slew of progressive laws concerning everything from marijuana to the 
minimum wage, inspiring lawmakers in other states.”). 
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B. Addressing the Erosion of Autonomy 
The CCPA and CPRA framework likely can be used to adequately protect 
genetic privacy, provided regulations are tailored to address the loss of consumer 
autonomy through electronic agreements, data collection, and use. The following 
recommendations regarding the use of the right to delete252 seek to address these 
issues. If regulations do not incorporate rules tailored to the genetic context, a 
separate genetic-privacy statute for DTC genetic testing companies may be needed. 
1. Electronic Agreements: The Fiction of Informed Consent 
The majority of personal genetic testing companies’ electronic agreements do 
not provide consumers with information regarding disclosure of their information 
to third parties or how their biospecimens or data may be used in the future.253 
There has also been a shift of the type of consent employed by DTC genetic testing 
companies from the traditional model of consent in genomic research (where a 
participant agrees to participate in one specified study) to broad consent (where a 
participant agrees to whatever future research the company may conduct).254 
Informed consent represents “the intersection between the right of personal 
autonomy (to make intimate decisions about one’s body or interpersonal 
relationships) and the right of informational privacy (to regulate both the subject’s 
access to relevant information and its disclosure to third parties).”255 
The illusory nature of consumer informed consent is an issue throughout the 
digital realm.256 In the DTC genetic testing context, the sole use of  
 
252. A similar concept, the right to be forgotten, originated from French law that allows a 
former convict who has served her sentence to block the publication of facts of her conviction and 
incarceration. Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88, 88 (2012). In 
2012, the European Commission recognized the right to be forgotten in its proposal of the Global Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR). Michael L. Rustad & Sanna Kulevska, Reconceptualizing the Right to Be 
Forgotten to Enable Transatlantic Data Flow, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 349, 366–67 (2015). The right to 
delete has been noted as a “subtly important but different concept from the right to be forgotten.” 
Grace Park, Note, The Changing Wind of Data Privacy Law: A Comparative Study of the European 
Union’s General Data Protection Regulation and the 2018 California Consumer Privacy Act, 10  
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1455, 1481 (2020) (citing PAUL BERNAL, INTERNET PRIVACY RIGHTS: RIGHTS 
TO PROTECT AUTONOMY 38 (2014)). Properly applied, the right to delete focuses on the right to 
control data and does not infringe upon the freedom of expression. Id. As such, a right to delete is 
more likely to be palatable to U.S. lawmakers, as scholars have noted the vast differences between the 
European and U.S. socio-legal contexts, including a difference in the value placed on securing the 
freedom of expression. See, e.g., Robert Kirk Walker, Note, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 HASTINGS  
L.J. 257, 270–72 (2012). 
253. Valerie Gutmann Koch & Kelly Todd, Research Revolution or Status Quo?: The New 
Common Rule and Research Arising from Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing, 56 HOUS. L. REV. 81, 114 
(2018); see also Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 12, at 48. 
254. Koch & Todd, supra note 253, at 115. 
255. Entrikin, supra note 143, at 862. 
256. See, e.g., Allyson W. Haynes, Online Privacy Policies: Contracting Away Control Over Personal 
Information?, 111 PENN STATE L. REV. 587, 610 (2007) (“The end-result of ubiquitous privacy policies 
should be an increase in the actual privacy of consumers’ personal information. However, scholars note 
that the result of the disclosure approach that has developed seems instead to be the exact  
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informed-consent models inadequately protects genetic privacy. As one scholar 
notes, “[t]he problem with notice and choice models is that they create incentives 
for companies to hide the risks in their data practices though manipulative design, 
vague abstractions, and complex words as the companies also shift risk onto data 
subjects.”257 Companies “decide the kind of boxes people get to check, buttons they 
press, switches they activate and deactivate, and other settings they get to fiddle 
with,” which amounts to a false sense of control by presenting limited choices as 
“more options” for users.258 Studies showing that very few Americans read online 
terms of service further indicate informed consent is a fiction in the digital and 
social-media era.259 
Professor Anya E. R. Prince has argued electronic agreements need to include 
information about the risks and benefits of current and potential future research, 
since it is impractical to require new informed consent for every subsequent 
research endeavor.260 Additionally, others have called for the implementation of 
“something more robust than click-through forms,”261 such as a web-based, 
interactive computer program that educates consumers on a specific subject matter 
while preventing “information overload,”262 or dynamic consent, a two-way, 
ongoing communication between researcher and research participant.263 While 
innovative informed-consent models could improve how informed consumers 
are,264 they still do not sufficiently address the loss of autonomy over genetic 
 
opposite: more ‘the appearance of privacy’ than the reality.”); Nancy S. Kim, Clicking and Cringing, 86 
OR. L. REV. 797, 810–14 (2007) (describing the difficulty of applying contract law in favor of 
consumers regarding non-negotiated software licenses); MacLean, supra note 128 (arguing that 
clickwrap agreements are adhesion contracts). 
257. Woodrow Hartzog & Neil Richards, Privacy’s Constitutional Moment and the Limits of Data 
Protection, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1687, 1734 (2020). 
258. Id. at 1735. 
259. See Jonathan A. Obar & Anne Oeldorf-Hirsch, The Biggest Lie on the Internet: Ignoring the 
Privacy Policies and Terms of Service Policies of Social Networking Services, 23 INFO. COMMC’N & SOC’Y 
128, 134, 137 fig.2, 138 (2020) (showing 97% and 93% of research participants agreed to a fictitious 
company’s privacy policies and terms of service, respectively, despite only spending less than one 
minute reading either, thus failing to catch the researchers’ “gotcha” clauses such as users’ having to 
assign their first-born children as the property of the fictitious company); see also AUXIER ET AL., supra 
note 113, at 10 (“[O]ne-in-five of adults overall say they always (9%) or often (13%) read [privacy] 
policies. Some 38% of U.S. adults maintain they sometimes read such policies, and 36% say they never 
read a company’s privacy policy before agreeing to it.”). 
260. Prince, supra note 168, at 218–19. 
261. Angela L. Morrison, Note, A Research Revolution: Genetic Testing Consumers Become 
Research (and Privacy) Guinea Pigs, 9 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 573, 604 (2011). 
262. Deepthy Kishore, Comment, Test at Your Own Risk: Your Genetic Report Card and the 
Direct-to-Consumer Duty to Secure Informed Consent, 59 EMORY L.J. 1553, 1595 (2010). 
263. Tara Sklar & Mabel Crescioni, Research Participants’ Rights to Data Protection in the Era of 
Open Science, 69 DEPAUL L. REV. 699, 717 (2020). 
264. See Rainer Böhme & Stefan Köpsell, Trained to Accept? A Field Experiment on Consent Dialogs, 
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2010 CHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN 
COMPUTING SYSTEMS 2404 (2010), https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/1753326.1753689 
[https://perma.cc/E32G-BNDZ] (finding button text most influential, with labels resembling an end 
user license agreement such as “I accept” or “I decline” receiving higher participation rates than those 
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information after consent has been given. The CCPA and CPRA seek to address 
this issue through new privacy rights, of which the right to delete deserves closer 
analysis as a mechanism for consumers to directly manage their genetic data beyond 
the initial signature on an electronic agreement. 
2. Data Collection and Use: The Right to Delete 
The CPRA’s amendment to California Civil Code section 1798.105 provides 
Californians with a right to delete that expands upon the original version from the 
CCPA.265 Under the right to delete, consumers “shall have the right to request that 
a business delete any personal information about the consumer which the business 
has collected from the consumer.”266 A business that receives a “verifiable 
consumer request” must delete the consumer’s personal information from its 
records and notify any service providers, contractors, and third parties to delete the 
consumer’s personal information, unless deletion would be “impossible or involves 
disproportionate effort.”267 
The right to delete is not absolute: a business, service provider, or contractor 
is not required to comply with a consumer’s deletion request where it is “reasonably 
necessary” for the entity to maintain the consumer’s personal information to meet 
certain exceptions.268 The exceptions most clearly addressing company and third 
party data collection and use are those involving compliance with the California 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA) and engagement in public or 
peer-reviewed research.269 Below are recommended parameters for the right to 
delete and each of these exceptions. 
a. The Right to Delete in Practice 
There are three considerations for a deletion request to be successfully 
processed under the California framework.270 The first consideration is what entities 
 
indicating real choice such as “I take part” or “I do not take part,” indicating that design of a consent 
form may influence user agreement or disagreement). 
265. California Privacy Rights Act of 2020, sec. 5, § 1798.105, 2020 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 24. 
266. § 1798.105(a). 
267. § 1798.105(c). 
268. § 1798.105(d). 
269. Id. 
270. The CCPA is the first of its kind in the U.S. David Kessler & Anna Rudawski, CCPA 
Extends “Right to Deletion” to California Residents, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (Sept. 27, 2018), https:/
/www.dataprotectionreport.com/2018/09/ccpa-extends-right-to-deletion-to-california-residents/#:~ 
:text=The%20law%2C%20the%20first%20of,is%20not%20a%20new%20right [https://perma.cc/ 
757D-MQXN]. Even though the European and U.S. socio-legal contexts are different, California’s 
right to delete has the potential to become a heavily used tool. See James Doubek, Google Has Received 
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need to comply with a consumer’s deletion request.271 The CPRA envisions a  
two-phase framework for deletion, wherein the consumer first requests deletion 
from a business, and the business in turn notifies and directs service providers, 
contractors, and third parties to delete the consumer’s personal information.272 This 
is a promising framework that addresses the call for data collectors to act as 
information fiduciaries who should be required to have the duties of loyalty, care, 
and confidentiality towards their consumers.273 Companies should not induce trust 
in their users to obtain information and then profit from the use of  
that information.274 
One issue with this framework lies in the scope of covered entities. Under 
both the CCPA and CPRA, businesses that need to be regulated are defined by their 
annual gross revenue, the number of consumers or households they acquire or 
transmit personal information from, and whether they derive fifty percent or more 
of their annual revenue from transmitting personal information.275 The CCPA and 
CPRA thus try to exclude small businesses from coverage, with the CPRA 
incorporating more small businesses by increasing the “number of consumers or 
households” prong.276 To uniformly protect genetic privacy, the covered businesses 
under the CCPA and CPRA must include all small businesses. 
The second consideration for successfully processing a deletion request is who 
should be able to make the request. Peter Fleischer, Google’s Global Privacy 
Counsel, has commented that there are three common deletion scenarios on the 
internet, in order of increasing controversy: (1) an individual posts something online 
and later wants to delete it; (2) an individual posts something online and another 
person copies it and reposts it elsewhere that the individual wants deleted; or  
(3) another person posts something about an individual, who wants the post 
deleted.277 The first and third deletion scenarios can be analogized to the DTC 
genetic testing context. Like the first deletion scenario, a consumer may send her 
 
271. California Privacy Rights Act of 2020 § 1798.105(c). 
272. § 1798.105(c)(1), (3). 
273. See Lindsey Barrett, Confiding in Con Men: U.S. Privacy Law, the GDPR, and Information 
Fiduciaries, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1057, 1094–95 (2019); see also Hartzog & Richards, supra note 257, 
at 1746 (“[T]he trust rules we are calling for have a broader application beyond the formalized 
framework of information fiduciaries. . . . [T]rustworthy entities have four features that the law should 
promote—discretion, honesty, protection, and loyalty.”). 
274. Barrett, supra note 273 (citing Jack M. Balkin, Fixing Social Media’s Grand Bargain 1, 13 
(Hoover Inst. Working Grp. on Nat’l Sec., Tech., & Law, Aegis Series Paper No. 1814, 2018), https://
www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/balkin_webreadypdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
QN2U-W94U].). 
275. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(c)(1) (2018); California Privacy Rights Act of 2020, sec. 14,  
§ 1798.140(d)(1) (modifying the CCPA language). 
276. See Elizabeth (Liz) Harding & Alex Polishuk, CPRA – What This Means for Your Business, 
NAT’L L. REV. (Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/cpra-what-means-your-
business [https://perma.cc/X4Y5-ZJQ9]. 
277. Peter Fleischer, Foggy Thinking About the Right to Oblivion, PETER  
FLEISCHER: PRIVACY. . .? (Mar. 9, 2011), http://peterfleischer.blogspot.com/2011/03/foggy-
thinking-about-right-to-oblivion.html [https://perma.cc/8TZR-XDPN]. 
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DNA to a company and later want to delete it. Like the third deletion scenario, 
either another person surreptitiously takes an individual’s DNA and sends it to a 
company for testing, or a relative of a third-party genetic database user may want to 
delete the user’s DNA. 
It is clear from the language of the CCPA and CPRA that a consumer who 
procured the services of a business has the right to request deletion.278 As noted by 
Fleischer and other scholars, the first deletion scenario where an internet user wants 
to delete her own posts—or a consumer wants to delete her own genetic 
information from a company’s database—is the least controversial deletion 
scenario.279 In the case of the third deletion scenario, which can be likened to 
situations involving surreptitious testing or the uploading of data to a third-party 
genetic database, deletion is more controversial.280 Based on the prevalence of 
surreptitious testing and its nonconsensual nature,281 victims of surreptitious testing 
should be able to request deletion from DTC genetic testing companies. Some 
scholars have argued to make nonconsensual genetic collection and testing a crime, 
and some states have passed laws addressing the issue.282 However, there should 
also be a noncriminal avenue to address surreptitious testing for those who do not 
want to press charges. 
According to current CCPA regulations, a consumer that does not have access 
to a password-protected account with a business may submit a deletion request, but 
the business must verify the identity of the consumer to a “reasonable or reasonably 
high degree of certainty depending on the sensitivity of the personal information 
and the risk of harm to the consumer posed by unauthorized deletion.”283 Further 
regulations should specify how verification would work in the DTC genetic testing 
context. The actual process of verifying non-account holders will likely be a 
conundrum for companies, since these companies require little in terms of initial 
identity verification when setting up an account and sending in a sample for 
testing.284 Even though there may be conflict with the freedom of expression, 
 
278. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105(a); California Privacy Rights Act of 2020, sec. 5, § 1798.105(a) 
(“A consumer shall have the right to request that a business delete any personal information about the 
consumer which the business has collected from the consumer.”). 
279. See Rustad & Kulevska, supra note 252, at 389; Fleischer, supra note 277. 
280. See Fleischer, supra note 277. 
281. See Christofides & O’Doherty, supra note 12; Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 12; Phillips, 
supra note 12, at 16–17, 19. 
282. Elizabeth E. Joh, DNA Theft: Recognizing the Crime of Nonconsensual Genetic Collection 
and Testing, 91 B.U. L. REV. 665, 670 (2011); Prince, supra note 168, at 211–12. 
283. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 999.325 (2020). 
284. For example, a 23andMe account can be created with only a name, email address, birth 
date, and password. 23andMe Registration Trouble?, 23ANDME, https://customercare.23andme.com/
hc/en-us/articles/204632060-23andMe-Registration-Trouble- [https://web.archive.org/web/202011 
30015512/https://customercare.23andme.com/hc/en-us/articles/204632060-23andMe-Registration-
Trouble- ] ( last visited Oct. 25, 2021). It is also fairly easy for a consumer to send in a DNA sample and 
link the sample to an account with false information. See Sarah A. Downey, How to Use 23andMe 
Without Giving Up Your Genetic Privacy, VENTUREBEAT (Sept. 20, 2013, 10:19 AM),  
https://venturebeat.com/2013/09/20/how-to-use-23andme-without-giving-up-your-genetic-privacy 
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“limiting the right [to delete] to private parties minimizes the chilling impact  
on speech.”285 
Another wrinkle regarding who can request the deletion of genetic data 
involves the family members of users who have chosen to take a DTC genetic test. 
For example, GEDmatch is a popular website that allows users to upload raw DNA 
data from DTC genetic testing companies like 23andMe and Ancestry, making it 
possible for people to find distant family members—both on and off the website.286 
Biological family members’ genetic identity and privacy “are inherently 
compromised because of the proliferation of partial DNA matching techniques” in 
DTC genetic databases and governmental forensic DNA databases.287 Family 
members thus may have an interest in requesting the deletion of their relatives’ 
genetic data. However, this falls most closely along the lines of Fleischer’s third, and 
most controversial, scenario, without the nonconsensual element of surreptitious 
testing.288 As such, deletion requests by family members of users should not be 
allowed due to concerns that laws may become difficult to implement and may 
inhibit free speech and research.289 Permissible deletion requests should therefore 
be limited to users who procured services themselves and to the victims of 
surreptitious testing. 
The third consideration regarding a deletion request is whether companies and 
their affiliates can avoid deletion of personal information if deletion is impossible 
or involves disproportionate effort.290 Consumer genetic information is attractive 
to data brokers, marketing and advertising corporations, pharmaceutical companies, 
employers, insurers, and law enforcement.291 Relationships between data subjects 
and data collectors stemming from the use of internet and mobile services, websites, 
apps, or major technology platforms like Google, Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and 
Microsoft mean that “many, if not most, privacy concerns are rooted in a 
relationship characterized by extreme information and power asymmetries.”292 
Companies thus have an incentive to avoid deletion requests, particularly where data 
is so valuable, as in the DTC genetic testing context. 
 
[https://perma.cc/47NC-M3K5]. Given the difficulty of matching a non-account holder’s deletion 
request with an account, the ironic solution might be that the non-account holder must send another 
sample of her DNA to the company for it to cross-check its databases. 
285. Rustad & Kulevska, supra note 252, at 398. 
286. Sarah Zhang, How a Tiny Website Became the Police’s Go-To Genealogy Database, ATLANTIC 
( June 1, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/06/gedmatch-police-genealogy-
database/561695 [https://perma.cc/KBV2-2NY9]. 
287. Entrikin, supra note 143, at 867–88; see also Zhang, supra note 286. 
288. Fleischer, supra note 277 (“I cannot see how such a right could be introduced without 
severely infringing on freedom of speech. This is why I think privacy is the new black in  
censorship fashion.”). 
289. Prince, supra note 168, at 208. 
290. California Privacy Rights Act of 2020, sec. 5, § 1798.105(c), 2020 Cal. Legis. Serv.  
Prop. 24. 
291. Drabiak, supra note 125. 
292. Hartzog & Richards, supra note 257, at 1745. 
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Further regulations are needed to define what constitutes impossibility and 
disproportionate effort. For example, it is foreseeable DTC genetic testing 
companies may argue de-identified consumer information already in use in internal 
or external research is impossible to delete or would involve disproportionate effort, 
even if the data was collected without consent. The CCPA and CPRA allow research 
with data that has been pseudonymized and de-identified or de-identified and in 
the aggregate.293 However, numerous scholars have found that re-identification of 
de-identified data can be easily done.294 It is worth exploring whether de-identified 
data should be deleted in surreptitious testing cases, and if so, whether this should 
be provided for within the CCPA and CPRA framework or an alternative  
genetic-privacy statute. 
b. The CalECPA Exception 
Law enforcement has increasingly turned to genetic genealogy to solve cold 
cases, which has led to the successful identifications of serial killers such as Joseph 
James DeAngelo (the Golden State Killer).295 The Golden State Killer case was the 
first high-profile case to be solved using genetic genealogy.296 The capture of 
DeAngelo after decades of evading the police inspired dozens of other agencies to 
employ the same methods in solving their violent crimes.297 Clearly, there is a 
substantial public-safety benefit to law enforcement’s use of genetics databases.298 
However, concerns regarding unwarranted intrusion into innocent parties’ privacy 
are still valid, given that one study found sixty percent of Americans of Northern 
European descent can be identified using DTC genetic testing sites, whether or not 
those individuals have used the services.299 
The interests in protecting genetic privacy and ensuring public safety thus 
appear to be on a collision course. Under the CCPA and CPRA, businesses and 
their affiliates do not have to comply with a deletion request where they must 
 
293. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(s) (2018); California Privacy Rights Act of 2020, sec. 14,  
§ 1798.140(ab) (“[De-identified] information cannot reasonably identify, relate to, describe, be capable 
of being associated with, or be linked, directly or indirectly, to a particular consumer, by a business.”). 
294. See Koch & Todd, supra note 253, at 117–18 (describing a series of studies demonstrating 
the ease of re-identification); Elizabeth R. Pike, Defending Data: Toward Ethical Protections and 
Comprehensive Data Governance, 69 EMORY L.J. 687, 719 (2020) (arguing the CCPA’s allowance of  
de-identified data is either “so broad as to render nearly all data identifiable or so narrow that large 
swaths of data [sic] unprotected”); Prince, supra note 168, at 207 (describing further studies that show 
re-identification is possible, and positing that biobank data can identify members of  
discrete populations). 
295. Entrikin, supra note 143, at 869–870. 
296. Levenson & Murphy, supra note 136. 
297. Id. 
298. Id. 
299. Heather Murphy, Most White Americans’ DNA Can Be Identified Through Genealogy 
Databases, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/11/science/science-
genetic-genealogy-study.html [https://perma.cc/YQ48-SA5K]. 
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comply with CalECPA.300 When initially reviewing Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence regarding police searches and seizures, genetic privacy seems to give 
way to governmental intrusion for the protection of public safety.301 Furthermore, 
the Fourth Amendment’s third-party doctrine establishes that there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy when information is voluntarily conveyed to a third party.302 
One scholar has hypothesized that because DTC genetic testing customers 
voluntarily give their biological samples to companies, the third-party doctrine 
would allow the government to gain access to these companies’ genetic databases.303 
California’s enactment of the CalECPA on October 8, 2015, was a turning 
point in protecting Californians’ digital privacy by requiring a warrant for searches 
of digital records such as emails, text messages, and geographic location.304 
CalECPA prohibits a government entity from compelling “the production of or 
access to electronic communication information from a service provider.”305 
CalECPA thus covers cloud-storage services like Dropbox, social-media sites like 
Facebook, and email providers like Google.306 Even though the outer boundaries 
of CalECPA are unclear,307 DTC genetic testing companies likely fall within the 
definition of a service provider because they are entities arguably offering to provide 
users with electronic-communication capabilities, act as an intermediary in 
communications, and store communication information.308 
Additionally, genetic data itself is likely covered under CalECPA. The statute 
has broad definitions for what counts as “electronic communication,” including 
“the transfer of signs, signals, writings, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any 
nature in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectric, or  
 
300. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105(d)(5) (2018); California Privacy Rights Act of 2020, sec. 5,  
§ 1798.105(d)(5), 2020 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 24. 
301. See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 465–66 (2013) (holding that taking a DNA sample 
from an arrestee via buccal swab did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it is a “routine  
booking procedure”). 
302. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (rejecting argument that petitioner had a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the numbers he dialed on his phone that were recorded by a pen 
register installed at a telephone company). 
303. Ayesha K. Rasheed, Personal Genetic Testing and the Fourth Amendment,  
2020 U. ILL. L. REV. 1249, 1255. 
304. Dave Maass, Victory in California! Gov. Brown Signs CalECPA, Requiring Police to Get a 
Warrant Before Accessing Your Data, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2015/10/victory-california-gov-brown-signs-calecpa-requiring-police-get-warrant-accessing 
[https://perma.cc/YDH9-PEQH]. 
305. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(a)(1) (2015). “Service provider” is defined as “a person or 
entity offering an electronic communication service.” § 1546(j). “Electronic communication service” is 
defined as “a service that provides to its subscribers or users the ability to send or receive electronic 
communications, including any service that acts as an intermediary in the transmission of electronic 
communications, or stores electronic communication information.” § 1546(e). 
306. Susan Freiwald, At the Privacy Vanguard: California’s Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act (CalECPA), 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 131, 147–48 (2018). 
307. Id. 
308. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546(j), (e). 
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photo-optical system.”309 The definition of “electronic communication 
information” is similarly broad, including “any information about an electronic 
communication or the use of an electronic communication service.”310 
Lauded as the “most privacy-protective legislation of its kind in the nation,”311 
CalECPA serves as an appropriate barrier to law enforcement intrusion into DTC 
genetic databases. The finding of probable cause to support a warrant should be 
the bar that law enforcement must rise above to conduct searches in databases that 
invade innocent parties’ privacy. For states drafting CCPA- and CPRA-like laws that 
do not also have strong legislation protecting governmental intrusion into electronic 
communications, it is important to include a provision explicitly stating law 
enforcement must procure a warrant before searching DTC genetic databases. 
c. The Research Exception 
The other notable exception applicable to genetic-deletion requests is the 
research exception under the CCPA and CPRA. The research exception explicitly 
allows businesses to retain consumer data when engaging in “public or  
peer-reviewed scientific, historical, or statistical research that conforms or adheres 
to all other applicable ethics and privacy laws, when the business’s deletion of the 
information is likely to render impossible or seriously impair the ability to complete 
such research, if the consumer has provided informed consent.”312 
Three main requirements must be met for the exception to apply. First, the 
exception only covers businesses, service providers, or contractors who engage in 
“public or peer-reviewed scientific, historical, or statistical research that conforms 
or adheres to all other applicable ethics and privacy laws.”313 Internal company 
research is not mentioned. For consumers to have an unfettered right to delete their 
genetic information from all internal research, regulators must firmly constrain the 
application of the exception to only public or peer-reviewed research. Furthermore, 
regulations must be clear that the internal-use exception314 cannot be used to 
undermine the research exception. 
 
309. § 1546(c) (emphasis added). 
310. § 1546(d). 
311. Freiwald, supra note 306, at 133. 
312. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105(d)(6) (2018); California Privacy Rights Act of 2020, sec. 5,  
§ 1798.105(d)(6), 2020 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 24. 
313. California Privacy Rights Act of 2020 § 1798.105(d)(6). 
314. The internal use exception states: 
A business, or a service provider or contractor . . . shall not be required to comply with a 
consumer’s request to delete . . . [t]o enable solely internal uses that are reasonably aligned 
with the expectations of the consumer based on the consumer’s relationship with the 
business and compatible with the context in which the consumer provided the information. 
§ 1798.105(d)(7). In the DTC genetic testing context, a company should not be able to claim that its 
consumers expect internal research to be conducted and that internal research is compatible with the 
context of a consumer providing DNA to the company. This is an important distinction to make 
because companies like 23andMe present themselves to be on the cutting edge of research and 
encourage consumers to participate in research, despite having numerous private-entity collaborators. 
See Research, supra note 23. 
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Limiting the research exception to public or peer-reviewed research addresses 
concerns that DTC genetic testing companies lack transparency when it comes to 
what they do with genetic data in their possession. As seen in one study,  
seventy-one percent of companies surveyed with readily accessible privacy policies 
regarding genetic data provided information that indicated a consumer’s genetic 
data could be used internally beyond the original transaction of providing test results 
for the consumer.315 Additionally, sixty-two percent of companies indicating such 
potential uses went further to explicitly state that a consumer’s genetic data could 
be used for internal research and development.316 Based on findings like these, it is 
appropriate for the legislature to discourage internal research by allowing consumers 
to delete their information freely. 
Second, the CPRA’s research exception applies in situations where deletion 
“is likely to render impossible or seriously impair the ability to complete such 
research.”317 Regulations are needed to further define impossibility and serious 
impairment. At present, it is unclear how many deletion requests would be 
considered as rendering impossible or seriously impairing a research endeavor. 
Researchers have affirmed that genetic-association studies with larger numbers of 
SNP markers require larger sample sizes, and these sample sizes must increase even 
more for genome-wide association studies.318 Another issue in research regarding 
gene-disease associations is the lack of replication of the original research findings, 
which typically means that the original research contained false positives.319 
Common biases in gene-disease association research include population 
stratification, misclassification of phenotype, genotyping error, and selection 
biases.320 Given these concerns, companies conducting research have an incentive 
to maximize the number of participants in their studies and may use the research 
exception to protect their investments at the expense of consumers’ genetic privacy. 
The definitions of impossibility and serious impairment must reflect the dual goals 
of promoting ethical research and protecting consumers’ genetic privacy. 
Third, in addition to the requirements of public or peer-reviewed research and 
the finding of impossibility or serious impairment of that research, a consumer must 
also have originally provided informed consent for a company to deny the 
consumer’s deletion request.321 This requirement demonstrates the continuing 
importance of informed consent in the DTC genetic testing context, despite 
 
315. Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 12, at 52. 
316. Id. 
317. California Privacy Rights Act of 2020 § 1798.105(d)(6). 
318. Eun Pyo Hong & Ji Wan Park, Sample Size and Statistical Power Calculation in Genetic 
Association Studies, 10 GENOMICS & INFORMATICS 117, 120 (2012). 
319. Ramal Moonesinghe, Muin J. Khoury, Tiebin Liu & John P. A. Ioannidis, Required Sample 
Size and Nonreplicability Thresholds for Heterogeneous Genetic Associations, 105 PROC. NAT’L  
ACAD. SCI. 617, 617 (2008). 
320. Id. 
321. California Privacy Rights Act of 2020 § 1798.105(d)(6). 
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scholars’ acknowledging its inadequacies.322 Consumers who are truly informed and 
consent to research are better positioned to preserve their autonomy over their 
genetic information.323 Therefore, regulators and consumers must view the right to 
delete as a tool to augment consumer autonomy and should not consider it as a 
panacea for genetic-privacy issues. 
CONCLUSION 
Big data and personalized medicine have spurred the growth of the DTC 
genetic testing industry into what it is today. The industry, which started out by 
offering consumers a glimpse into their genealogies, continues to develop in the  
health-care space and promises to deliver innovative health-related genetic tests and 
to aid in research efforts across a variety of scientific fields. The fact that DTC 
genetic testing companies have amassed so much genetic information is concerning. 
As is often the case, technology outpaces the law, and the legal framework in the 
United States applicable to DTC genetic testing—and more broadly,  
privacy—needs to be modernized. 
Recent state laws like the CCPA and CPRA324 seek to do just that, and they 
may serve as model legislation for other state laws or even a federal data-privacy 
law. In particular, the right to delete is a promising tool for consumers to utilize in 
regaining and maintaining their ability to make choices regarding their genetic 
information. The CCPA and CPRA provide exceptions to the right to delete that 
are largely in keeping with the necessity to balance deletion with legitimate interests 
in protecting public safety and promoting research. However, further regulations 
are needed to parse out the nuances of this new privacy right and its limitations. 
With legal tools such as the right to delete, consumer autonomy will hopefully be 







322. See supra Section IV.B.1. 
323. See supra Sections II.C, IV.B.1. 
324. As a testament to the recent rapid development of California privacy law, California 
Governor Gavin Newsom signed into law the Genetic Information Privacy Act (GIPA) governing 
DTC genetic testing companies approximately one month prior to the publication of this Note. Genetic 
Information Privacy Act, 2021 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 596 (West). Notably, GIPA requires DTC genetic 
testing companies to honor consumers’ revocations of consent by destroying biological samples within 
thirty days of revocation and deleting consumers’ accounts and genetic data, except where genetic data 
is required to be retained to comply with applicable legal and regulatory requirements. Id. GIPA does 
not provide explicit guidelines on how DTC genetic testing companies are to structure their new policies 
and practices. Id. Furthermore, GIPA does not reduce or eliminate obligations under other laws, 
including the more broadly applicable CCPA and CPRA. Id. I therefore affirm my thoughts and 
recommendations in Part IV of this Note and would similarly apply them to GIPA.  
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